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ANGLICANS, MERCHANTS, AND FEMINISTS: A
COMPARATIVE STUDY OF THE EVOLUTION OF MARRIED
WOMEN'S RIGHTS IN VIRGINIA, NEW YORK, AND
WISCONSIN
JOSEPH A. RANNEY*
As part of the explosion of interest in women's studies during
the past thirty years, legal scholars have paid increasing attention
to the evolution of women's property rights in the context of
marriage and divorce. Detailed studies have been made of women's
property rights during the colonial era,' of early nineteenth century
married women's property acts,2 and of the no-fault divorce
movement of the 1960s and 1970s and its consequences.3 Many
gaps, however, remain to be filled. For example, there are few
longitudinal studies tracing the complete history of women's
property rights for any state.4 The period from 1920 to 1960 has
been largely ignored even though important advances took place in
many states during that period.5 Apart from colonial era property
law and no-fault divorce law, there has been little effort to compare
the evolution of laws affecting women in different states or to
* B.A., University of Chicago, 1972; J.D., Yale Law School, 1978; Attorney, DeWitt
Ross & Stevens, S.C., Madison, Wisconsin. The advice and contributions of my colleague
Anne Taylor Wadsack in preparing this Article are gratefully acknowledged.
1. See generally MARYLYNN SALMON, WOMEN AND THE LAW OF PROPERTY IN EARLY
AMERICA (1986) (examining contract, divorce, and inheritance law); Joan R. Gundersen &
Gwen Victor Gampel, Married Women's Legal Status in Eighteenth-Century New York and
Virginia, 39 WM. & MARY Q. 114 (1982) (comparing social, economic, and political systems
in New York and Virginia and their impact on the evolution of married women's property
rights).
2. See generally NORMA BASCH, IN THE EYES OF THE LAW: WOMEN, MARRIAGE, AND
PROPERTY IN NINETEENTH-CENTURY NEW YORK (1982) (discussing the property rights of
women in the 1880s); Richard H. Chused, Married Women's Property Law: 1800-1850, 71
GEo. L.J. 1359 (1983) (tracing the development of women's property rights in the early
1800s).
3. See generally DIVORCE REFORMATTHE CROSSROADS (Stephen D. Sugarman & Herma
Hill Kay eds., 1990) (discussing new directions in divorce reform since the advent of no-fault
divorce laws); HERBERTJAcOB, SILENT REVOLUTION: THE TRANSFORMATION OF DIVORCE LAW
IN THE UNITED STATES (1988); MILTON C. REGAN, JR., ALONE TOGETHER: LAW AND THE
MEANINGS OF MARRIAGE (1999) (chronicling the development of the divorce movement of the
mid to late 20th century).
4. Compare JOAN HOFF, LAW, GENDERAND INJUSnCE: A LEGAL HISTORYOFU.S. WOMEN
(1991) (containing a good longitudinal historical survey of women's rights for the United
States as a whole but devoting little attention to comparison of states and regions), with
JOSEPH A. RANNEY, TRUSTING NOTHING TO PROVIDENCE: A HISTORY OF WISCONSIN'S LEGAL
SYSTEM 203-26, 563-82 (1999) (containing a basic longitudinal study for Wisconsin).
5. See infra Part IV.
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examine how such differences might reflect broader differences in
state cultures. 6
o , This Article is an attempt to start filling these gaps. It
compares the evolution of women's property rights in three very
different states: Virginia, New York, and Wisconsin. These three
states were chosen in order to test the hypothesis the author has
advanced elsewhere that the two most important determinants of
how a state's legal culture evolves are the era in which it was first
settled and whether it was a slave state.7
Virginia was one of the original colonies, and, as such, one
could hypothesize that its legal system was shaped heavily by
British law and the relatively simple social and economic
relationships of the pre-industrial era.' Because Virginia was a
slave state, one also could hypothesize that its legal system put a
premium on preserving an established social hierarchy and that
because the hierarchy was male-dominated, Virginia's legal system
was relatively uncongenial to women.9
New York also had its origins in colonial times, but it has been
America's most commercially advanced and culturally diverse state
throughout much of its history.10 One could hypothesize that
because of its diversity and commercial leadership, New York's
legal culture put a premium on innovation in order to accommodate
the social and economic changes wrought by the industrial
revolution. Such openness to innovation would include a higher
than average receptivity to improving women's rights-checked to
some extent, perhaps, by the need to shed colonial legal traditions
as part of that process.1'
Wisconsin, like New York, was a free state12 settled initially by
New Englanders and soon after by a variety of European
immigrants.'" Wisconsin was never a British colony: it began life
as a western state, steeped in enthusiasm for Jacksonian social
6. But seegenerally JACOB, supra note 3 (comparing the development of no-fault divorce
in New York, California, and Wisconsin); SALMON, supra note 1 (providing a detailed
comparison of the laws of different states during the colonial era).
7. See RANNEY, supra note 4, at 648-54.
8. See Louis D. RUBN, VIRGINIA: A BICENTENNIAL HISTORY 14-15,33-38 (1977).
9. See id.; DAVID HACKETT FISCHER, ALBION'S SEED: FoUR BRITISH FOLKWAYS IN
AMERICA 291-97 (1989). See generally VIRGINIUS DABNEY, VIRGINIA: THE NEW DOMINION
(1971) (detailing Virginia's history from 1606-1970).
10. See DAVID M. ELLIS ET AL., A HISTORY OF NEW YORK STATE ix-xii (1967).
11. See BASCH, supra note 2, at 110-12; ELLiS ETAL., supra note 10, at 175-80, 256-63,
275-88.
12. See RANNEY, supra note 4, at 5.
13. See id. at 227-28.
ANGLICANS, MERCHANTS, AND FEMINISTS
reforms."' One could hypothesize that the evolution of women's
rights in Wisconsin roughly paralleled their evolution in New York.
Wisconsin was not a commercial leader, as was New York, and thus
had less economic incentive to make legal innovations. Wisconsin
also had, however, no colonial legal tradition to overcome, and its
Jacksonian origins gave it an inbred tradition of reform that New
York did not have.'5
Women's property rights have indeed evolved differently in the
three states studied here, but the differences are more subtle and
complex than the above predictions suggest. Virginia generally has
been the slowest of the three states to adopt statutory women's
rights reforms, such as married women's property acts and no-fault
divorce.'6 Themes of honor and of protection of extended families
are deeply woven into the state's hierarchical tradition, however,
and as a result Virginia courts consistently have found ways to
extend women's property rights and bend conservative divorce laws
where they have considered that necessary to achieve fairness for
women and the families from which they come. 7 New York has
made some important innovations in women's rights law in order
to meet changing conditions generated by its economic leadership,
most notably the nation's first comprehensive married women's
property act in 1848." New York's cultural diversity, however, led
to deadlock over divorce reform for more than a century, making
New York one of the most conservative states as to divorce until the
1960s.' 9 Wisconsin's reform impulses have taken an erratic course
with respect to women's rights. The state enacted a far-reaching
equal rights law in 1921, an advanced form of no-fault divorce in
1977, and a pioneering community property law in 1983,2° but
otherwise it often has followed a conservative course with respect
to women's rights."1
14. See i at 28.
15. See JAMES WHLARD HURST, THE GROWTH OF AMERCAN LAW: THE LAW MAKERS 8-9
(1950); RANNEY, supra note 4, at 47-49.
16. See infra text accompanying notes 169-70, 196.
17. See infra notes 215, 235-36, 249-60 and accompanying text.
18. See infra text accompanying note 146.
19. See infra text accompanying note 399.
20. See infra notes 335, 373, 393 and accompanying text.
21. This Article focuses primarily on statutes and cases addressing married women's
property rights directly and on the way in which divorce law has affected married women's
power and wealth. It mentions only in passing another area of law, dower and related
inheritance rights, which historically also has played an important role in women's property
rights. See, e.g., SALMON, supra note 1, at 13-21; CAROLE SHAMMAB ETAL, INHERITANCE IN
AMERICA: FROM COLONIAL TIMES TO THE PRESENT 83-101 (1987). The relationship between
inheritance law and women's rights in America has been more subtle and complex than the
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I. THE COLONIAL AND EARLY REPUBLICAN ERAs (1607-1820)
During the American Colonial era (1607-1776) and the early
Republican era (1776-1820), Virginia and New York borrowed
heavily from English common law in shaping their concepts of
married women's rights.22 They were not slavish to the common
law, however. Both states used trusts and related equitable devices
to allow married women to preserve their property by means of
premarital trusts.23 Both did so in order to preserve such property
to the original kinship group from which it came.2' Virginia did this
to preserve an established social order; New York arguably was
more concerned with allowing kinship groups free control of their
property in the interest of economic growth.25 In the late eighteenth
century, New York became the first of the three states studied here
to transfer divorce powers from the legislature to the courts on a
limited basis.26
A. Virginia: Women's Rights as a Social Preservative
Women's rights in early Virginia appear paradoxical to modern
eyes. Virginia, like all other colonies, adhered to the English
common law doctrine of marital unity, holding that the husband
was the legal master of the marriage relationship. Virginia
strongly condemned divorces and made them nearly impossible to
obtain.2" Yet it also used contract law to allow many wives to
maintain control of their property, notwithstanding the common
law's strong strictures against such control.29 In fact, there was no
relationship between property and divorce law and women's rights; accordingly, inheritance
law does not provide as clear a picture of lawmakers' changing attitudes toward women as
do property and divorce law. A detailed study of the relationship between inheritance law
and women's rights would extend the length of this Article unduly, but its omission here
should not be understood as minimizing its importance.
22. See infra text accompanying notes 27, 46, 94.
23. See infra text accompanying notes 52-58, 68-69, 104.
24. See id.
25. See infra text accompanying note 106.
26. See infra text accompanying note 110.
27. The British jurist William Blackstone formulated the most widely-cited definition of
the doctrine: "By marriage, the husband and wife are one person in law: that is, the very
being or legal existence of the woman is suspended during the marriage, or at least is
incorporated and consolidated into that of the husband: under whose wing, protection, and
cover, she performs every thing.' 1 WILLIAM BiACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF
ENGLAND 430 (1765-69), quoted in SALMON, supra note 1, at 200 n.1.
28. See infra notes 39-40 and accompanying text.
29. See infra notes 52-58 and accompanying text.
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paradox at all. All these rules were designed to preserve the two
things most important to Virginians---stable property ownership
and social order.
Unlike the northern colonies, immigrants looking more for
economic advancement than for greater social and religious freedom
settled Virginia.' Virginia was also one of the most agriculturally
oriented of the colonies: no cities or industries of any size developed
during its first two centuries of existence."s Power resided almost
exclusively in ownership of land and of the labor needed to work the
land.32
Daughters of the planter class remained very much a part of
their original kinship groups after they married; they were not
expected to and did not always transfer their primary allegiance to
their husbands.' The reasons for this were both social and
economic. Family identity was an integral part of Virginians' sense
of hierarchy and order, and retention of land holdings was the key
to preserving wealth and power.' Under the common law, planters
who had only daughters faced the prospect that at their death the
family lands would effectively pass to the daughters' husbands.3 5
Much of the early history of Virginia's women's rights law consists
of efforts to prevent such results.ss
Property preservation devices were developed in the context of
property law rather than divorce law because Virginia's love of
things English extended to the Anglican church, and Anglican
doctrine regarded marriage as "an indissoluble union-a sacred
knot that could never be untied by mortal hands." 7 In the words of
a leading social historian of Virginia, "marriage was regarded as
something to be arranged between families, something that did not
require love as a precondition, something that could never be
dissolved, and something that joined husband and wife in an
30. See RUBIN, supra note 8, at 12.
31. See id. at 13-14, 33-35.
32. See id. at 33-38. The planter class had a genuine sense of responsibility for the
welfare of all white Virginians and did not flaunt its power unnecessarily. It allowed some
social mobility: smaller planters had real opportunities to increase their holdings and gain
admittance to power, and there was much intermarriage between the two classes. As a
result class distinctions acquired a degree of acceptance, but also a degree of casualness,
which did not exist in other colonies or states. See i.
33. See FISCHER, supra note 9, at 281-86, 292-95.
34. See id. at 283.
35. See id.
36. See RUBIN, supra note 8, at 36-38; see also FISCHER, supra note 9, at 284, 292-97
(describing prenuptial agreements in Virginia involving families of the husband and wife as
well as tenants of the land belonging to the families).
37. FISCHER, supra note 9, at 281.
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organic and patriarchal hierarchy."8 Divorce was reserved for
those rare occasions when a chronically violent husband put his
wife's life at risk.3 Using it as a tool to end marriages for mere
husbandly improvidence or incompatibility was unthinkable. 0
The unity doctrine posed formidable obstacles to, the
preservation of kinship group property." Under the doctrine, the
husband acquired ownership of all property that his wife brought
to the marriage and all her property and earnings acquired during
the marriage.42 Married women could not bring lawsuits in their
own names to protect their financial interests; they could not act as
trustees, estate executors, or legal guardians; and they could not
make contracts or transfer property unless they did so jointly with
their husbands.43 In addition, the unity doctrine deprived married
women of the ability to provide security for themselves and their
children in the event of their husbands' death." This was a
particular concern in Virginia and other southern colonies, in which
men had lower life expectancies than men in the northern colonies,
thus producing a numerous class of young widows. 45 Accordingly,
Virginia embraced with particular enthusiasm the British concept
of dower, which guaranteed a widow a fixed share of her husband's
real property at death."
The two most important devices used to soften the effects of the
unity doctrine were the will theory of contract and the rule of
private examination.4' Prior to the industrial revolution of the late
eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, contracts generally were
made in the context of a limited set of traditional social
relationships, such as those between master and servant and
between family members.48 Courts interpreted and enforced such
contracts with an eye to the preservation of social norms, and as a
result the parties were not always free to make the exact
agreements they wished. 9 With industrialization, economic
38. Id. at 286.
39. See id. at 281.
40. See iti
41. See BASCH, supra note 2, at 51-52.
42. See id.
43. See id. at 51-55.
44. See id.
45. See SALMON, supra note 1, at 159-60.
46. See BASCH, supra note 2, at 52-55; Gundersen & Gampel, supra note 1, at 120-22.
47. See infra notes 52-69 and accompanying text.
48. See MORIoNJ. HORWrrL, THETRANSFORMATIONOF AMERICAN LAW, 1780-1860, at 160-
61(1977).
49. See KEV M. TEEVEN, A HISTORY OF THE ANGLO-AMERICAN COMMON LAW OF
CONTRACT 181 (1990).
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bargains between strangers became more common, and in order to
promote economic growth the courts increasingly adopted the will
theory.' Parties were free to make whatever bargains they wished,
and the social constraints the courts were willing to impose on such
bargains narrowed greatly.5 1 It is striking that despite the great
value Virginians placed on tradition and order, long before the
industrial revolution Virginia courts used the will theory freely to
uphold a variety of agreements between wives and prospective
husbands to modify or even eliminate the unity doctrine from their
marriage.
The matter-of-factness with which Virginia courts upheld such
agreements is remarkable. Two early cases are illustrative. Tabb
v. Archer,52 decided in 1809, involved two sisters who were heiresses
to a large estate of land and slaves in the Petersburg area. The
Tabb sisters' suitors agreed, at the insistence of the sisters' mother,
to relinquish all claims to property that the sisters would inherit.5
The husbands would have an interest only in the income from the
property, which would be used for family support.'" After marriage,
the husbands persuaded the sisters to sell their property.55 In one
instance, it was sold to a third party who promptly deeded it back
to the husband.' Mrs. Tabb, as trustee of her daughters' property
under the agreements, sued the husbands for breach of contract.5"
The Supreme Court of Appeals, Virginia's highest court, summarily
rejected the husbands' argument that the contracts were void as
violative of the unity theory, and devoted most of its opinion to
interpreting and enforcing the terms of the agreement.58
In 1816, in Scott v. Gibbon & Co.,59 the Supreme Court of
Appeals of Virginia upheld a premarital agreement that barred the
husband from access to both his wife's property and income. The
court was concerned about the fact that the agreement was
obviously designed to shelter assets from the husband's creditors.6 0
One justice went so far as to suggest that the court should consider
creating an equitable rule giving husbands and their creditors a
50. See id.
51. See HORWITL, supra note 48, at 175-204; TEEVEN, supra note 49, at 181; G. EDWARD
WHrrE, TORT LAW IN AMERICA AN INTELLECTUAL HIwORY 3-5 (1980).
52. 13 Va. (3 Hen. & M.) 399 (1809).
53. See id. at 401-02.
54. See id.
55. See id. at 402-04.
56. See i&
57. See id at 403-04.
58. See id. at 418-21.
59. 19 Va. (5 Munf.) 86 (1816).
60. See id. at 90-91.
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share of income from wives' assets during the marriage."' In the
end, however, even he agreed with his colleagues that premarital
agreements properly drafted to foreclose such a result would be
enforced according to their terms.62
Another important device Virginia developed to protect married
women was the private examination requirement.' Virginia, like
most colonies, extended married women's dower rights to all
property transferred during the husband's lifetime and refused to
limit it to property the husband held at death." As a result, most
creditors refused to accept land from husbands as security for sales
or loans unless the wife agreed to release her dower right to the
land as part of the transaction."' In 1734, Virginia enacted one of
the first examination statutes in the colonies, providing that dower
releases would be enforceable only where the wife was examined
privately to ensure that her consent was not coerced and the
examination results were recorded with the local court." Virginia
courts enforced the examination and recordation requirements
consistently and strictly for the next 150 years.6 Closely related to
this, the courts also indicated a preference that property saved to
the wife under a premarital agreement be given to a trustee rather
than the wife herself for administration. For example, the
premarital agreements at issue in the Tabb case allowed the
husbands to administer the Tabb estates in place of a trustee."
When the case came before the Court of Appeals, the court on its
own initiative appointed a trustee in order to avoid further
wrongdoing by the husbands.6 9
Two factors, in addition to the desire to preserve kinship group
power, played an important role in the shaping of women's property
rights in Virginia."' First, Virginia, like most southern, but unlike
most northern, colonies and states, had separate law and equity
courts.7 ' Because the common law was so restrictive of women's
61. See id. at 91-95 (Coalter, J., concurring).
62. See id. at 95.
63. See SALMON, supra note 1, at 18.
64. See id. at 151-52.
65. See 2 JAMEs KENT, COMMENTARIES ON AMERICAN LAW 153-54 (New York, 0. Halsted
2d ed. 1832). Although it is doubtful that the examination requirement eliminated all
duress, scholars of the subject generally have concluded the requirement provided a genuine
degree of protection to women. See SALMON, supra note 1, at 40-44.
66. See SALMON, supra note 1, at 20.
67. See iU at 31-32.
68. See Tabb v. Archer, 13 Va. (3 Hen. & M.) 399, 402 (1809).
69. See iU at 431.
70. See SALMON, supra note 1, at 11-12.
71. See iU
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property rights, virtually all important cases involving such rights
were brought in equity, and Virginia's official acceptance of a
separate equity system encouraged the courts to bend the common
law freely to shape women's rights through marriage settlements
and otherwise.72 Equity was particularly important in the early
development of divorce law." Judicial divorce was virtually
unknown before 1800; only the legislature could grant absolute
divorces, and Virginia legislatures very rarely did so. 4
Nevertheless, separations occurred regularly and in such cases the
equity courts could grant separation decrees, more commonly
known as divorces a mensa et thoro (from bed and board).7 5
Virginia equity courts had broad power to force husbands to provide
what the courts considered adequate support for wives.7  The
courts exercised this power freely, not out of any particular desire
to empower women but because the absolutist Anglican view of
marriage included a strong belief that a husband had a duty to
support his wife during marriage and that such duty did not
diminish in the least if the couple separated."
Second, slavery was intertwined with women's property rights
issues as with so many other components of life in Virginia." In
1705, the Virginia legislature defined slaves as part of real estate
for purposes of determining a widow's dower. 9 In making this rule
Virginia departed from most other colonies, which treated slaves as
personal property not subject to dower rights."' The 1705 law
suggests Virginia wished to keep slaves with their original owners,
probably more out of concern for preserving property of the original
72. See id.
73. Divorce law is an important part of women's property rights law because it provides
an avenue by which a wife can regain the legal rights and independence of a single woman
and, in addition, can obtain an interest in the property of the marriage (through property
division) and the earning power attributable to the marriage (through a maintenance award).
Thus the standards under which divorce can be obtained and under which property and
earning power are allocated at divorce are important to determining the relative power of
married women in a particular state.
74. In 1681 a commentator noted with pride that Virginia had granted no absolute
divorces and only one separation decree in its first 60 years of existence. See FISCHER, supra
note 9, at 281-82. There is no evidence that the rate increased during the next 150 years.
75. See SALMON, supra note 1, at 60, 62, 65.
76. See id.
77. For an example of an early case discussing support standards, see Purcell v. Purcell,
14 Va. (4 Hen. & M.) 507 (1810). The Purcell case also presents an early example of an
unfortunate modern trend. After the court made its initial support order, the husband failed
to pay and the case returned to the court on an application for a contempt order. See i& at
509-11.
78. See SALMON, supra note 1, at 152; Gundersen & Gampel, supra note 1, at 121-22.
79. See SALMON, supra note 1, at 152.
80. See Gundersen & Gampl, supra note 1, at 121-22.
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family than for the slaves' welfare, although the latter concern may
not have been entirely absent.'"
Many of the important early women's property rights cases in
Virginia involved the disposition of slaves, and the courts generally
managed to achieve results that minimized the risk that slave
families would be broken up.'2 For example, in the 1820 case Smith
v. Smith's Administrators," the court upheld a mother's conveyance
of slaves to her married daughter for the daughter's exclusive use,
the slaves to be returned to the mother or her estate at the
daughter's death.' The intent of the conveyance apparently was to
keep the slaves in the mother and daughter's kinship group.' 5 The
court had no difficulty concluding the mother's wishes should be
enforced, and it rejected the husband's argument that the unity
doctrine gave him the right to the slaves at the daughter's death."
In Hughes v. Pledge,"7 the court reviewed a premarital agreement
which allowed the couple the use of the wife's slaves during her
lifetime but provided they "should not be at the disposal, or subject
to the control, debts, forfeitures or engagements, of the . . .
husband."'" The court overturned the husband's attempt to give the
slaves to one of his creditors in order to pay off a debt.' 9 Even
though the agreement had not been recorded as required by
Virginia law, the court had no trouble upholding the agreement on
81. See SALMON, supra note 1, at 152-53.
82. See infra text accompanying notes 86, 89.
83. 20 Va. (6 Munf.) 581 (1820).
84. See id. at 583-84.
85. See id.
86. See id. Thrift v. Hannah provides a particularly dramatic example of how slavery
troubled the Virginia courts in the context of women's rights. See Thrift v. Hannah, 29 Va.
(2 Leigh) 300 (1830). In Thrift, a Maryland woman, Rachel Magruder, provided in 1796 that
her slave, Hannah, was to be emancipated in 1807. See id. at 331-32. Rachel married in
1799. See id. at 332. Under Maryland law, the document of emancipation had to be
authenticated in court. See id. at 333. Rachel died in 1811, see id, and the emancipation
document was not authenticated until 1819. See id. at 335. A deeply divided Virginia
Supreme Court of Appeals held on a 3-2 vote that Hannah was not free. Justice William
Cabell noted that prior to authentication an emancipation document "can never operate as
a contract: there can be no contract between master and slave." Id. at 318 (Cabell, J.,
concurring). Under the unity doctrine, the husband acquired an interest in Hannah at
marriage and was not bound by the emancipation agreement. The dissenters argued that
at marriage the interest a husband acquires in his wife's property is subject to all limitations
imposed on the property before marriage, in this case the emancipation document, and that
Hannah should be freed. See id. at 316 (Green, J., dissenting).
87. 28 Va. (1 Leigh) 443 (1829).
88. Id. at 444 (emphasis omitted).
89. See id. at 44748.
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the ground that the creditor had actual notice of the agreement at
the time the husband incurred his debt."
B. New York: The Beginnings of a Conflicted System
A mix of legal cultures shaped New York's early law as to
women's property rights.9 ' The Dutch legal system, which applied
to the colony during its first 40 years, contained important strains
of community property law.92 It permitted couples, for example, to
make joint wills under which the wife would automatically become
entitled to half the marital estate at her husband's death.9 After
Great Britain took control of the colony in 1664, it gradually
replaced the Dutch system with English law but continued to
enforce wills made under Dutch law. 4 Eighteenth century English
settlers in New York shared many of the Anglican and hierarchical
values of Virginians, but those values were tempered by the fact
that commerce and manufacturing quickly became an important
part of New York's economy."5 Generally, New Yorkers preferred
business development and growth to strict social order where the
latter impeded the former." Virginians did not.97
In addition, a large migration of New Englanders to the upstate
New York frontier between 1780 and 1820 added a new layer of
influences to New York law and culture.9" Views of divorce and
family in New England differed considerably from those in Virginia.
90. See i& It may be significant that these cases were decided prior to 1830, at a time
when many Virginians were ambivalent about slavery and believed gradual emancipation
might be desirable. This attitude changed after 1830. The Nat Turner slave revolt of 1831
scared many moderates into believing that blacks and whites could not live together
peacefully if widespread emancipation took place, and the raising of slaves for export to
newer southern states became an increasingly important part of Virginia's economy. See
DABNEY, supra note 9, at 226-29. The few reported cases involving slaves and women's
property rights after 1830 arguably show less concern over keeping slave families intact than
pre-1830 cases. Compare Hughes, 28 Va. (1 Leigh) at 443, with Jennings v. Montague, 43 Va.
(2 Gratt.) 350 (1845). In Jennings, the court held that when a husband had used slaves his
wife brought to the marriage as security for a debt and there was no marriage agreement
restricting his rights, even though the wife had obtained a divorce a mensa et thoro and the
trial court had returned the slaves to her as allowed by Virginia's divorce statute, the court's
order was invalid because the creditor had acquired its security interest before the divorce
and the court could not impair that interest. See id. at 352-53.
91. See infra notes 92-103 and accompanying text.
92. See Gundersen & Gampel, supra note 1, at 118
93. See id.
94. See i& at 118-20.
95. See id.
96. See ia
97. See BASCH, supra note 2, at 110-12.
98. See ELLIS ET AL, supra note 10, at 189.
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The Puritans viewed marriage and the family as an integral part of
an individual's covenant with God and of her quest for grace." Yet
failure to perform according to the terms of the Puritan covenant
provided grounds for divorce.'0° As a result, a divorce was more
easily obtained in New England than in Virginia.'' In New
England as well as Virginia, women enjoyed neither the social
status nor the legal rights available to men. Puritan theology,
however, treated women as the spiritual equals of men in some
respects.' 2 Although Puritan wives could not rely on an extended
kinship system to serve as a check on their husbands' control of
their property, the Puritan husband's duties to God provided an
equivalent check.' New England influence also played an
important part in the development of married women's property
law in New York.
Early New York and Virginia women's property law had more
similarities than differences. The differences, however, were
significant. New York, like Virginia, observed the unity doctrine
but softened it by allowing women to save their property from
husbandly control through the use of premarital agreements and
trusts." Yet New York placed much less importance on safeguards
against waiver of dower rights than did Virginia. New York did not
enact a private examination statute until 1771, and the courts
generally did not regard failure to comply with the statute as a
reason to void waivers unless there was clear evidence that the
wife's release had in fact been coerced.' °5 It is not clear whether the
legislature and the courts of New York had a more sanguine
attitude than their Virginian counterparts toward a woman's ability
to resist coercion or whether they simply felt that the certainty and
reliability of title transfers in New York, and thus the interests of
commerce, would be unduly impeded by allowing wives to challenge
property transfers based on formalistic rather than substantive
defects.1l 6
With respect to divorce, New York occupied a peculiar and
rather ambivalent position on the spectrum between the New
99. See FISCHER, supra note 9, at 70.
100. See id. at 78.
101. See id. at 281.
102. See id. at 83.
103. See FISCHER, supra note 9, at 85.
104. See BASCH, supra note 2, at 72-75; SALMON, supra note 1, at 28-30, 41-44, 112-15.
105. See SALMON, supra note 1, at 28.
106. See id. at 28-30, 41-44.
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England model and the southern model that Virginia exemplified.107
As a practical matter, New York was far less liberal than New
England in granting divorces; indeed, absolute divorces were almost
as rare in New York as in Virginia.1 8 But like Virginia, New York
used equity courts and separation decrees as a safety valve to
resolve bad marriages. 109 New York was considerably more muted
in its criticism of divorce than was Virginia.
New York's first divorce statute, enacted in 1787, reflected its
ambivalent position. The 1787 law conferred divorce authority on
the courts some forty years before Virginia did so."' The
legislature, however, retained concurrent authority to grant
divorces, and it made adultery the only grounds for absolute
divorce.11' The statute made fault a primary consideration; an
adulterous party could not remarry under any circumstances. 112
The law was controversial from its inception. The state council
of revision, led by George Clinton and other leaders who would soon
become the nucleus of the Jeffersonian party in New York, objected
to the law's harsh limitation on remarriage. Despite the council's
veto, the law's drafters, led by Alexander Hamilton and other
Federalists, secured passage of the provision.1 ' During the next 50
years, repeated efforts to broaden the grounds of divorce were
made, but all failed, "not so much [from] a stern sense of duty [on
the part of the legislature] as an inability to give the problem of
marital law more than fitful attention."" 4 The only reform came in
1813, when the legislature authorized the courts to award
separation decrees in cases of cruelty or other behavior making it
unsafe for a wife to live with her husband, and in cases of
abandonment." 5
107. For a detailed discussion of early divorce law in the southern states, see SALMON,
supra note 1, at 58-80.
108. See id. at 61.
109. See NELSON M. BLAKE, THE ROAD TO RENO: A HISTORY OF DIVORCE IN THE UNITED
STATES 43 (1962).
110. See id. at 52, 64.
111. See id. at 64; 1787 N.Y. Laws 59, reprinted in 1 LAWS OF STATE OF NEW YORK 93-94
(1802).
112. See BLAKE, supra note 109, at 65.
113. See id.
114. Id. at 64. In 1813, an effort to add desertion as a ground for absolute divorce failed.
In 1827, growing enthusiasm for temperance spurred an effort to add habitual drunkenness,
which also failed. Several efforts in the 1840s met a similar fate. See id. at 66.
115. See id. at 66.
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II. THE JACKSONIAN ERA (1820-1850)
From roughly 1820 to 1850, a series of closely related reform
movements, popularly associated with Andrew Jackson and his
supporters, dominated much of American political discourse."1 " The
movements, which included goals such as increased popular
participation in politics and government, expansion of debtors'
rights, checks on the power of banks and creditors, and expansion
of the, United States across the North American continent, were
linked by a common desire to renew the ideal of a decentralized
democracy first articulated by Thomas Jefferson and his
followers. 17
Jacksonian reform sentiments strongly affected women's rights
in New York and Wisconsin. Beginning about 1815, New York
gradually abandoned the requirement that married women place
their property in trust in order to shelter it from their husbands.11
In 1848, this movement reached a logical conclusion when the state
passed a married women's property act, allowing women to control
their property directly for the first time. 19 Wisconsin enacted a
similar law in 1850, soon after gaining statehood. Reform in both
states, however, stemmed as much from a desire to help insolvent
husbands shelter family assets from creditors as from a desire to
increase women's rights.12 Less influenced by Jacksonian
sentiments, Virginia did not enact a married women's property act
until 1877. Yet during the Jacksonian era, it, too, made some
important advances in liberalizing its divorce law. 1'
A. New York: A Brief but Glorious Revolution
Though the Jacksonian reform movement drew its political
strength chiefly from the newer American states west of the
Appalachians, much of its intellectual leadership came from New
York, and the Jacksonian era in New York also witnessed the
greatest wave of women's property rights reforms in the state's
history. The reforms were not purely a product of Jacksonian
sentiment: to a large extent, they were the culmination of decades
of changes in British and American law.
116. See ARTHUR M. SCHLESINGER JR., THE AGE OF JACKSON 134 (1945).
117. See id.
118. See SALMON, supra note 1, at 106-07.
119. See BASCH, supra note 2, at 156.
120. See infra Parts II.A-B.
121. See infra Part II.C.
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New York increased married women's property rights modestly
even before the Jacksonian era began. 12' During the middle of the
eighteenth century, English and American jurists began to question
whether it was really necessary to use trusts to preserve the
separate character of a married woman's property.1" England
formally eliminated the trust requirement in 1769,124 and
Chancellor James Kent led New York in the same direction in
1815.121 In Methodist Episcopal Church v. Jaques,"2 Kent held that
premarital agreements creating passive trusts-that is, trusts that
created nominal trustees but allowed married women beneficiaries
to manage the trust assets actively-were valid and would be
enforced according to their terms."2 Kent argued that the terms of
such trusts should be construed narrowly, 128 but several years later
the Court for the Correction of Errors, New York's highest court at
the time, modified Kent's decree and held that broader construction
was appropriate.'" In Bradish v. Gibbs,3 0 Kent formally held for
the first time that no trust of any sort was necessary and that
married women could keep their property separate by means of a
simple premarital agreement.131 Kent also held, with some
reluctance, that a separate estate could be used to preserve as
separate property not only the estate property itself but all income
it generated. 1
32
122. See SALMON, supra note 1, at 90-91.
123. See id. at 112-15.
124. See BASCH, supra note 2, at 74-88.
125. See id. at 76.
126. 1 Johns. Ch. 450 (N.Y. Ch. 1815).
127. See id. at 458.
128. See id. at 457.
129. See Jaques v. Methodist Episcopal Church, 17 Johns. 548 (N.Y. 1820).
130. 3 Johns. Ch. 523 (N.Y. Ch. 1818).
131. See id. at 551.
132. See id. The progress ofwomen's property law was thrown into temporary uncertainty
in 1828 when, as part of a broad revision of the New York statutes, the legislature provided
that "{elvery estate which is now held as an use executed under any former statute of this
state is confirmed as a legal one.' 1 N.Y. REV. STAT. 727, § 47 (1829), reprinted in BASCH,
supra note 2, at 80 n.22. Many commentators interpreted the statute as abolishing passive
trusts and their usefulness as a vehicle for separate property. But in a series of cases
between 1835 and 1845, Chancellor Reuben Walworth declined to interpret the statute so
broadly. See, e.g., Knowles & Hume v. McCamly, 10 Paige Ch. 342 (N.Y. Ch. 1843); North
Am. Coal Co. v. Dyett, 7 Paige Ch. 9 (N.Y. Ch. 1837); see also BASCH, supra note 2, at 80-82
(discussing the Dyett case). After the Chancery Court was abolished in 1846, the new Court
of Appeals agreed with Walworth's holdings. See Blanchard v. Blood, 2 Barb. 352 (N.Y. Sup.
Ct. Gen. Term 1848). The 1828 statutes allowed married women to dispose of separate
property freely during their lifetime, but they excluded married women from their recitation
of persons competent to make a will. In Strong v. Wilkin, 1 Barb. Ch. 9 (N.Y. Ch. 1845),
Walworth reduced the threat this provision posed to women's rights by holding that married
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There is no evidence that Kent's decisions giving women the
right to control their property directly were motivated by any
particular sympathy for women's rights. Kent made it clear in the
Commentaries that he was quite comfortable with the husband's
traditional role as master of the couple.1" More likely, Jaques and
Bradish reflected a recognition that separate estates for women
benefited New York's increasingly commercialized society:
Equity offered couples who had spare assets at marriage the
opportunity to protect a portion of those assets from some of the
risks of the marketplace. Some astute middle-class couples
were bound to take advantage of this option. The separate
estate, however, best served landed and mercantile elites, the
same classes for whom the first exceptions to common law
marital rules had been carved out in English equity....
Mercenary [marriage] alliances were common throughout the
period and increased in the 1840s. Marriage was simply an
integral part of the acquisitive scramble in Jacksonian New
York.134
The movement to give married women the statutory right to keep
their property separate without need for their husbands' consent
began in the early 1830s."s5 Several western states in which
Jacksonism was deeply entrenched enacted limited married
women's property acts in the late 1830s.13 Assemblyman Thomas
Herttell introduced the first such proposal in New York in 1836.
Opposition to a property rights law surfaced quickly. Many
men-and women-genuinely feared that such a law would
revolutionize society and destabilize the economy and, in so doing,
hurt women more than help them.137
Herttell and a group of prominent allies including John L.
O'Sullivan, Elizabeth Cady Stanton, Ernestine Rose, and Paulina
Wright Davis advanced a variety of arguments to combat these
women could control the disposition of their property by will if the trust creating separate
property specifically gave them that right.
133. See KENT, supra note 65, at 129-32, 178-87. One modern commentator, however, has
argued that Kent's view of women was considerably more respectful than Blackstone's.
Unlike Blackstone, Kent viewed married women's subordinate role as a matter of social
policy rather than want of ability. See BASCH, supra note 2, at 62.
134. BASCH, supra note 2, at 110-11.
135. In the late 18309 and early 1840s several states enacted statutes exempting wives'
property from their husband's premarital debts. See, e.g., 1835 Ark. Terr. Laws 34-35, noted
in Chused, supra note 2, at 1399 n.205. Mississippi enacted the first statute of any breadth
in 1839. See 1839 MISS. LAWS 72, noted in Chused, supra note 2, at 1399 n.207.
136. See Chused, supra note 2, at 1398-1401.
137. See BASCH, supra note 2, at 135.
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fears.1 8 They relied in part on the growing sentiment for more
favorable legal treatment of debtors: married women's property
acts could be used to shelter at least part of a couple's assets from
creditors."s In New York, growing sympathy for the plight of
debtors had resulted in relaxation of the laws of imprisonment for
debt during the 1820s and early 1830s." The debtor relief
movement gained impetus nationwide when a severe depression
began in 1837,141 and it was aided in New York by an anti-rent
movement. 142 The anti-rent movement abolished remnants of the
feudal landholding system in which a handful of Dutch and English
patroon families had operated huge agricultural estates in the
Hudson Valley and southern New York on a tenancy basis for
almost two centuries." Another effective argument invoked by
reformers combined a direct political challenge to extend
Jacksonian democratic principles to women and a sentimental
appeal based on the "cult of true womanhood"-that is, the
increasingly popular view of women as noble but fragile creatures
who needed protection from vice-prone husbands, particularly from
the consequences of drunkenness and improvidence.'"
At New York's 1846 Constitutional Convention, which in many
ways was the high-water mark of the Jacksonian movement in New
York, reformers almost achieved their goal. The convention voted
to place a married women's property clause in the constitution, but
three days later reconsidered and overturned its vote for reasons
that are still not entirely clear."46 In 1848 the reformers finally
138. O'Sullivan was editor ofthe United States Magazine and Democratic Review and was
perhaps the leading intellectual of the Jacksonian movement. See id. at 138. Stanton was
a nationally prominent women's rights leader throughout the last half of the 19th century
and is best known for her role in the fight for women's suffrage. Rose and Davis were leaders
of the women's movement in New York. See id. at 136-37.
139. See BASCH, supra note 2, at 13542.
140. See PETER J. COLEMAN, DEBTORS AND CREDITORS IN AMERICA: INSOLVENCY,
IMPRIsoNMENT FOR DEBT, AND BANKRupTcy, 1607-1900, at 105-29 (1974).
141. See ELLIS ETAL., supra note 10, at 216.
142. See id. at 220.
143. See id. at 160.
144. See BASCH, supra note 2, at 115. Herttell also expressed concern about the potential
for confusion that the 1828 statutory revisions had created, and argued that a sweeping law
clarifying women's rights would help eliminate such confusion. See id. at 116-17.
145. See BASCH, supra note 2, at 150. The clause which was passed and later rescinded
provided that:
All property of the wife, owned by her at the time of her marriage, and that
acquired by her afterwards by gift, devise or descent, or otherwise than from
her husband, shall be her separate property. Laws shall be passed providing
for the registry of the wife's separate property, and more clearly defining the
rights of the wife thereto as well as to property held by her with her husband.
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succeeded in obtaining a married women's property act, the central
provision of which read:
The real and personal property of any female who may
hereafter marry, and which she shall own at the time of
marriage, and the rents issues and profits thereof shall not be
subject to the disposal of her husband, nor be liable for his
debts, and shall continue her sole and separate property, as if
she were a single female. 1
The 1848 statute was a pioneering measure at the national and
state levels. No previous women's rights law had covered as broad
a scope of property. Nevertheless, the law was conservative in
important ways. In particular, it did not contain enforcement
provisions and it did not give women the right to enter into
contracts independent of their husbands. Perhaps the legislature
discerned a cautionary lesson from past opposition and regarded
the law as something of an experiment. 147  Over the next few years
the legislature filled many of the gaps in the 1848 law with
considerable speed, by New York standards. In 1849 it gave women
the power to petition for control of their assets previously placed in
trust.148 During the 1850s reformers focused their efforts on
obtaining for women the right to control their own earnings and
eliminating the long-standing legal presumption that the husband
should have guardianship of a couple's children. In 1860 they
succeeded when the legislature modified the 1848 law to allow a
married woman control of all property "which she acquires by her
trade, business, labor or services."' 4 The 1860 earnings law also
explicitly authorized married women to operate businesses on their
own accounts, to contract to the extent necessary to operate such
businesses, and to sue and be sued with respect to their property.150
In cases in which a husband would not consent to his wife's transfer
of her separate real estate, the courts were authorized to transfer
the property upon petition of the wife unless there was "good cause"
for not doing so."' Finally, the law also decreed that married
2 JOURNAL OF THE CONVENTION OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK 1264-65 (1846), reprinted in
BASCH, supra note 2, at 150-51.
146. See 1848 N.Y. Laws 200, § 1.
147. See BASCH, supra note 2, at 157.
148. See 1849 N.Y. Laws 375. In 1851, the legislature also allowed women to vote shares
of stock they owned. See 1851 N.Y. Laws 321.
149. 1860 N.Y. Laws 90; see also BASCH, supra note 2, at 176-42.
150. See 1860 N.Y. Laws 90, §§ 4-6.
151. See id
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couples were joint guardians of their children and that the wives
were to have "equal powers, rights and duties in regard to them,
with the husband." 52
Unlike property rights, liberalization of divorce was not a part
of the Jacksonian program in New York. The most notable
development in divorce law during the Jacksonian era was the
passing of anti-reform leadership from the old Federalists to the
Catholic church, which assumed an important place in New York
politics due to the influx of Irish and German immigrants to the
state in the mid-nineteenth century."5 The change in the dynamics
of the divorce reform debate can be illustrated by two quotations,
one from the beginning and one from the end of the Jacksonian
period. Chancellor Kent was an exemplar of the old conservative
leadership. In his Commentaries, first published at the beginning
of the Jacksonian era, he opposed the liberalization of separation
grounds for reasons of social policy and general morality.1
Separation agreements, he argued, were "hazardous to the morals
of the parties.... [I]t is throwing the parties back upon society, in
the undefined and dangerous characters of a wife without a
husband, and a husband without a wife." 55 By 1850, the debate
had shifted from a question of general policy and morality to the
question of protecting Protestant values against encroaching
Catholicism. An 1850 legislative committee report criticized the
theory of indissolubility of marriage in ethnic terms that would
have made Kent and even his opponents blanch:
"[The] pernicious effects [of restrictive divorce laws] are visible
in the social institutions and domestic manners of most of the
countries of Catholic Europe. And a more forcible commentary
can scarcely be made upon the subject under consideration than
by a comparison of the manners and morals of two such
[Protestant] countries for example, as Scotland and Holland,
where not only adultery but desertion are causes of divorce with
the morals and manners of Italy or Spain, where the marriage
tie is indissoluble."'"
152. Id. at§9.
153. See ELLiS ETAL., aupra note 10, at 285.
154. See KENT, supra note 65, at 127-28.
155. Id.
156. N.Y. ASSEM. Doc. No. 75-73 (1852), quoted in BLAKE, supra note 109, at 77. The 1852
legislature that produced this commentary was one of the few New York legislatures of the
19th century controlled by the Whigs. Up to 1854, the Democratic Party, which was
considerably more receptive to Catholics and immigrants and consequently less receptive to
divorce reform, controlled most sessions of the legislature. See id. at 76-78.
The 1852 committee's reaction to Catholicism is in striking contrast to Kent's views
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Divorce reforms were proposed sporadically throughout the
1840s and 1850s but they all failed, usually because of legislative
committee inaction and delay rather than a direct vote against
them. 157
B. Wisconsin: Western Jacksonians and Women's Rights
Wisconsin came into existence as a state at the end of the
Jacksonian era. Perhaps largely due to its frontier status,
Wisconsin was a more thoroughly Jacksonian state than was New
York. 158  A constitutional convention was called to prepare for
statehood shortly after New York's 1846 Constitutional Convention
concluded, and Wisconsin Jacksonians, like their New York
counterparts, tried to enshrine a guarantee of married women's
property rights in the state constitution. As in New York, both
sides framed the debate more in terms of debtor protection than in
terms of women's advancement. In order to allay fears that a
married women's property provision would revolutionize relations
between the sexes, supporters of the provision spoke of women in
sentimental terms and discounted the idea that women might
actually use their new rights in an independent manner. One
supporter argued:
Let every member ask himself the question .... Is it true that
his bosom companion, the young, intelligent, and lovely wife,...
who... separated herself from friends that were near and dear
to her to embark with her bare-handed husband for the far
West, taking in all probability the last farewell of friends, afflu-
ence, and luxury, would ever for the mere paltry consideration
on the community property system, which at that time was confined to Catholic Europe and
Latin America. Kent initially criticized the community property system as unduly
complicated, but he clearly understood its underlying "presumption that the wife, by her
industry and care, contributes, equally with the husband, to the acquisition of property."
KENT, supra note 65, at 183. He concluded: "It cannot be denied, that the pre-eminence of
the Christian nations of Europe, and of their descendants and colonists in every other
quarter of the globe, is most strikingly displayed in the equality and dignity which their
institutions confer upon the female character." Id. at 187.
157. See BLAKE, supra note 109, at 76-78.
15S. For example, Wisconsin adopted several of the most important Jacksonian legal
reforms much earlier in its history and with considerably fewer struggles than New York.
Wisconsin abolished imprisonment for debt in 1837, while it was still a territory. See 1837-
38 Wis. Terr. Laws 37. New York abolished imprisonment for debt in stages over the better
part of a century. See 1831 N.Y. Laws 300. Wisconsin's first state legislature enacted a
homestead exemption law in 1848. See Wis. REv. STATS. §§ 51-58 (1849). New York had
enacted a homestead law earlier, but only after extensive debate. See 1815 N.Y. Laws 227.
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of dollars and cents become the tyrant of him she thus loved and
adored? Who believes that [married women's property rights]
will make a fiend of a worthy wife?... Sir, I do contend that for
the true merit the female sex stand much higher than the male.
They know but little of the low, truckling, vacillating
demagogism that pervades the male portion of creation, and in
that particular their ignorance is a jewel. 159
Wisconsin voters rejected the 1846 constitution in part because of
the married women's property clause, although many did so only
because they felt such reforms should be enacted by statute rather
than enshrined as a constitutional right."'o The constitution adopt-
ed at statehood in 1848 left the issue to the legislature, which pass-
ed a married women's property act in 1850.161 Wisconsin's 1850 law
was modeled closely on the 1848 New York law, with one important
difference: the New York law explicitly provided that married
women's property would remain available to satisfy their husbands'
debts incurred before passage of the act. 62 The Wisconsin law
contained no such provision."6 The Wisconsin legislature also did
not give women the right to control their own earnings.'"
Wisconsin's early divorce laws, like those of many other
western states, were shaped by the state's Jacksonian sentiments
and the fact that unlike New York and Virginia, Wisconsin was not
an heir to more rigid seventeenth and eighteenth century notions
of divorce. The state's 1848 constitution abolished all legislative
divorce;165 and the state's first domestic code, enacted in 1849,
allowed broader grounds for divorce than in New York and Virginia.
In addition to adultery and impotence, grounds for divorce in
Wisconsin included cruel and inhuman treatment, habitual
drunkenness, desertion, or imprisonment of one spouse.
16
159. David Noggle, Exemption and the Rights of Married Women, The Convention of 1846,
reprinted in 27 WiscONSN HISTORIcAL COLLECTIONS 658, 662 (Milo M. Quaife ed., The
Society Madison 1919).
160. See RANNEY, supra note 4, at 58-61.
161. See Act of Feb. 1, 1850, ch. 44, 1850 Wis. Laws 29.
162. See 1848 N.Y. Laws 200, § 2.
163. See 1850 Wis. Laws 29.
164. See id. The difference in wording between the two acts eventually turned out to be
academic. In 1880, the Wisconsin Supreme Court indicated that the 1850 law did not shelter
married women's property from the claims of husbands and their creditors based on
obligations incurred before the act's passage, because to interpret the act otherwise would
be to render it unconstitutional. See McKesson v. Stanton, 50 Wis. 297, 304-05 (1880).
165. See WIS. CONST. of 1848, art. IV, § 24.
166. See 1849 Wis. Laws 79; Mark A. Stamp, Wisconsin's Marriage and Divorce Laws: A
Historical Perspective 78-79 (1982) (unpublished L.L.M. thesis, University of Wisconsin) (on
file with author).
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C. Virginia: An Era of Reform at the Margins
Virginians were less receptive to Jacksonian reforms than were
New Yorkers and Wisconsinites. During the decades before the
Civil War, however, Virginia made some important social reforms.
Most notably, a readjustment in 1851 gave the western part of the
state representation more proportional to its population and
reduced the power of the planter class. 16 7 Yet this progress was
counterbalanced by the state's increasing reliance on the slave
trade during the Jacksonian period and by the resultant need to
defend slavery and its underlying social order.6 '
Virginia did not enact a married women's property act during
the Jacksonian era. Its most important reform affecting women
during the era was the transfer of divorce-granting functions from
the legislature to the courts. Pressures for liberalized divorce
appeared in the early nineteenth century and rose slowly but
steadily as the century progressed.6 " In 1827, the Virginia
legislature gave the courts concurrent power to grant absolute
divorces and separations. 17 0 The initial effect of this change was
more symbolic than real because the legislature permitted divorce
only on very narrow grounds. Absolute divorces could be granted
for impotence, "idiocy," and bigamy, and separation decrees were
allowed for adultery, cruelty, and "just cause of bodily fear." 71
Reflecting the state's longstanding equity practice, the
legislature gave the courts broad powers to divide property and
provide for the support of wives and children "as may seem right"
and declared that the courts should "restore to the injured party, as
far as practicable, the rights of property conferred by the marriage
on the other.1 7M The legislature, however, also imposed some
checks on the courts and made clear its intent that divorce should
not be made easy. 73 Evidence from outside parties was required in
order to support a decree of absolute divorce. 17 "4 Thus, the divorcing
spouses could not collude to show impotence or idiocy. The
167. See Dabney, supra note 9, at 222.
168. See id at 277-78.
169. See BLAKE, supra note 109, at 60-52.
170. See 1826-27 Va. Acts oh. 23, §§ 1-2.
171. Id. § 2.
172. Id. § 3.
173. See id.
174. See id.
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legislature also indicated that fault should be considered in
awarding property and support.175
In 1841, the legislature added abandonment and desertion as
grounds for separation decrees. 17  In 1848, it relinquished its
divorce-granting powers and added adultery as a ground for
absolute divorce.1 77  In 1853, the legislature made desertion a
ground for absolute divorce as well as for separation.17
The most important women's rights issue the Virginia Supreme
Court of Appeals was called upon to address during the Jacksonian
era, both in the context of interpreting the new divorce laws and in
the context of married women's property rights, was how competing
claims of a wife and her husband's creditors to her property should
be balanced. In Jennings v. Montague,7 1 the court held that lower
courts could not exercise their divorce powers to restore wives'
premarital property where that would interfere with creditors'
rights."S When a husband pledged his wife's property as security
for the debt, the property could only be restored to the wife subject
to the security interest.1 '1
Shortly before the Civil War, the Supreme Court of Appeals
made two incremental but important advances in married women's
property rights. In Penn v. Whiteheads [sic], 8 2 the court held that
in the context of businesses operated by husbands but owned by
wives, the relative rights of wives and creditors of husbands must
be balanced." Creditors who made sales or loans to the husband
based on the business were entitled to some interest in the
business's assets, particularly where the husband provided most of
the skill and labor for the business, but the wife was to be given
priority over creditors to the extent of her "just interests" or for
"necessary support of [the] family."' 8 Poindexter v. Jeffries' 5
175. See id.
176. See 1840 Va. Acts ch. 71, §§ 1-2.
177. See 1848 Va. Acts ch. 122.
178. See BLAKE, supra note 109, at 22.
179. 43 Va. (2 Gratt.) 350 (1846).
180. See id. at 353.
181. See id,
182. 53 Va. (12 Gratt.) 74 (1855).
183. See ia at 79-82.
184. I& at 81. When the Penn case returned to the Supreme Court of Appeals after the
Civil War, the court affirmed in broad terms the right of women to engage in trade apart
from their husbands and elaborated on its prior decision. Wives could put their assets into
a business and allow their husbands to run it without subjecting the assets to claims by the
husband's creditors, but to the extent the profits were due to the husband's labor they would
be reachable by his creditors. See Penn v. Whitehead, 58 Va. (17 Gratt.) 503, 512-13 (1867).
185. 56 Va. (15 Gratt.) 363 (1859).
20001 515
516 WILLIAM & MARY JOURNAL OF WOMEN AND THE LAW [Vol. 6:493
conclusively established the "wife's equity" doctrine in Virginia,
holding that a wife who instituted a separation or support
proceeding against an insolvent husband would have an equitable
claim against the husband's assets.' The court left open the
possibility that notwithstanding the deference to creditors required
by Jennings, courts might be able to exercise their equitable powers
to award a certain portion of the husband's assets to the wife even
if other creditors had previously perfected an interest in the
assets. 187
III. THE ERA OF THE FIRST WOMEN'S MOVEMENT (1850-1920)
In women's history, the years from 1850 to 1920 are best
known as the era of the rise and triumph of the women's suffrage
movement. In the three states studied here, the era also was
marked by a struggle to consolidate and implement married
women's property reform. The New York and Wisconsin courts
declined to interpret their married women's property acts liberally:
women could make contracts and could keep their own earnings
only within the strict limits of the original laws, which limits were
mildly extended by the New York and Wisconsin legislatures from
time to time.' 8 Following the social upheaval of the Civil War and
Reconstruction eras, which wrought major changes in the role of
women in Southern society, Virginia enacted a married women's
property act in 1877.1 9 The Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals did
not go out of its way to limit the act by narrow construction,
perhaps because by the time it was called upon to deal with the act
the general legitimacy of such acts was well established in the
United States. Virginia also began to catch up with New York and
Wisconsin in shaping its modern divorce law.'9 °
A. Virginia: Edging Toward Modern Women's Rights
One student of married women's property acts has identified
three phases of the property acts movement.19' The first phase,
186. See id. at 380.
187. See id. at 372-73. New York had previously adopted the wife's equity doctrine;
indeed, the courts' power to make the wife an allowance out of an insolvent husband's estate
over the claims of creditors seems never to have been in doubt. See BASCH, supra note 2, at
90-91; KENT, supra note 65, at 16-22.
188. See infra text accompanying notes 257-77, 292-308.
189. See infra text accompanying note 207.
190. See infra text accompanying notes 228-56.
191. See Chused, supra note 2, at 1398.
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which took place before and during the 1840s, featured laws
sheltering property brought to the marriage by wives from their
husbands' creditors. ' The second phase, which took place between
1840 and 1870, witnessed the enactment of laws explicitly
classifying such property as wives' separate property and giving
them limited direct control over it.193 The third, which took place
in most states during the 1870s, gave women control over-their
earnings.19' As has been seen, New York and Wisconsin passed
through all three phases between 1848 and 1860.'95 Virginia
followed a different pattern. It enacted no women's property
statutes before the war, but passed through the first and second
phases simultaneously when it finally enacted a married women's
property act in 1877.""6 Virginia never enacted a separate earnings
law.
Virginia's delay was not due to happenstance. The political and
social impulses responsible for married women's property reform in
New York and Wisconsin were virtually nonexistent in Virginia
before the Civil War. Debtor rights was not an important issue:
the Virginian concept of honor afforded little sympathy to debtors
who did not pay their bills, and the 1837 depression which fueled
concern over the issue in New York and Wisconsin had considerably
less impact on Virginia than on most other states. 19 7 Virginia's love
of established order and its relatively advanced system of equitable
protection for married women dampened the impulse to redefine
women's role in society, which had been an element behind married
women's property reform elsewhere. However, the many deaths
and widespread destruction that the Civil War wrought in Virginia
changed women's role in Virginia society profoundly: "In some
ways the South in 1865 became again a frontier where there were
few precedents to help people deal with their problems and few
supporting structures for those who needed support."19 In addition,
"the experience of self-sufficiency during the war had opened the




195. See infra text accompanying notes 257-77, 292-301.
196. See infra note 207 and accompanying text.
197. See DABNEY, supra note 9, at 231-33. Virginia enacted some provisions to make it
easier for hard-pressed debtors to pay, but the state consistently resisted abolition of
imprisonment for debt. See COLEMAN, supra note 140, at 191-206 (describing Virginian
approaches to economic hardship).
198. ANNE FIROR SCOTT, THE SOUTHERN LADY: FROM PEDESTAL TO POLITICS, 1830-1930,
at 94 (2d ed. 1995).
199. Id. at 101.
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"[flunctionally the patriarchy was dead, though many ideas
associated with it lived on for years."2"
The war also brought debtors' rights to the forefront of Virginia
politics for the first time.2"' The federal government required all
the former Confederate states to repudiate their wartime debts as
a condition of being readmitted to representation in Congress.2 2
Many states seriously considered using the occasion to repudiate
their prewar debts as well and start afresh. Virginia, ever
conscious of honor, did not.20 3 As a result, most of the limited
revenue which the state could elicit from taxation of a war-ravaged
populace went to pay interest on the state debt at the expense of
education, subsidies for railroads and business, and other projects
which were becoming important to many Virginians for the first
time.20 ' An increasing number of Virginians came to favor partial
or complete repudiation of the state's debt or, failing that,
restructuring of debt payment over a longer period in order to
release tax revenues for more important purposes. 25 By the mid-
1870s the "Readjusters" were an important force in Virginia
politics; they controlled the state from 1879 to 1885.2" There is
little direct evidence of what motivated the 1877 legislature to pass
a property rights law, but in 1877 the concepts of women's role in
society and of the proper treatment of debt had reached
approximately the same state in Virginia as they had reached in
New York and Wisconsin in the 1840s, and it is reasonable to
conclude these were the main forces behind the 1877 Virginia act.
Not surprisingly, the legislature tried to make up for lost time by
combining into one law features that New York and Wisconsin had
adopted gradually over time. The 1877 Virginia act contained the
basic provisions of the 1848 New York law. The Virginia act also
authorized married women to contract with regard to their property
and, where their husbands would not agree to the conveyance of
their separate property, empowered women to petition the courts
to authorize conveyance.20 7
200. Id. at 102.
201. See ERIC FONER, RECONSTRUCTION: AMERICA'SUNFINISHED REVOLUTION, 1863-1877,
at 302-04, 325-28, 374-77 (1988).
202. See id. at 375-77.
203. See DABNEY, supra note 9, at 377.
204. See id.
205. See id
206. See id. at 374-93; RUBIN, supra note 8, at 143-47.
207. See 1876-77 Va. Acts ch. 265, §§ 1, 3. Unlike New York and Wisconsin, the Virginia
Supreme Court of Appeals never had to address the issue of whether the act applied to the
rights of husbands and their creditors that had vested before passage of the act. If the issue
had come before the court, most likely it would have followed New York's and Wisconsin's
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The 1877 act generated substantial protest among Virginia's
legal traditionalists. John B. Minor, a long-time law professor at
the University of Virginia and the author of a treatise widely used
by Virginia lawyers during the late nineteenth and early twentieth
centuries, was one of the leading critics of the law.' ° Interestingly,
Minor was more disturbed by the general threat the act posed to
traditional Virginian social values than by the specific changes it
made in the law.2 He complained that the act operated:
To subvert the long-tried, and, in the main, well-settled
doctrines of the common law . . . to abolish virtually the
husband's headship of the family, contrary to the common law,
to common reason, to the Scriptures, and to the fruitful
experience for many centuries of the race from which we spring.
... to introduce causes of domestic strife... [and] to encour-
age[ I frauds against creditors ... . 0
Minor particularly complained of the 1877 act's failure to insulate
husbands from debts incurred by their wives even though it had
deprived husbands of the ability to prevent their wives from
running up such debts.211 The 1887 legislature modified the law to
insulate the husband's separate estate from the wife's premarital
debts and debts she incurred in running a separate business,2 12 and
in 1900 it eliminated husbands' liability for their wives' torts and
other wrongs committed during marriage.213 Minor was somewhat
mollified by these changes, but he continued to emphasize that "no
modifications can do away with the grave objections to the policy of
such legislation."2 1'
The Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals construed its state's
property act more even-handedly than did the New York and
Wisconsin courts. This is surprising, considering Virginia's long
delay in enacting such a law and the continuing conservative
opposition to the act. The reasons for the court's even-handedness
are not clear, but two explanations are plausible. First, because
lead and would have held the act could not be applied retroactively. See infra text
accompanying notes 259-60, 295.
208. See generally 1 JOHN B. MINOR, INSTITUTES OF COMMON AND STATUTE LAW
(Richmond, Whittet & Shepperson 3d ed. 1882) (discussing common and statutory law
relating to the rights of people).
209. See id. at 346-47.
210. Id.
211. See id at 347, 369.
212. See 1887 Va. Code 103, § 2290.
213. See 1900 Va. Acts ch. 1139(3).
214. MINOR, supra note 208, at 348.
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Virginia had taken so long to make a commitment to a married
women's property act and because such acts were relatively
common by 1877, the court may have been more reluctant to limit
the act by judicial construction than judges in New York and
Wisconsin. Second, the upheaval in the role of women in southern
society caused by the Civil War and Reconstruction, combined with
the remnants of Virginia's equity court tradition which had always
been relatively liberal as to women's property rights, may have
created a more accepting judicial climate than existed in New York
and Wisconsin.
In Williams v. Lord & Robinson,"'5 the first major case
involving the 1877 act, the Supreme Court of Appeals indicated that
the act conferred very broad rights on women and would be
enforced according to its terms. The court gave no sign that it
would try to interpret the act restrictively. Conversely, the court
refused to apply other restrictions on disposal of property less
strictly to women than to men.16 For example, prior to 1877 it was
not uncommon for husbands to try to shelter their own property
from creditors by transferring the property to their wives or to a
trust in the wife's name.217 In response, the courts had created a
rebuttable presumption that such transfers were fraudulent.218 In
Yates v. Law2 9 and again in Johnson v. Ables, 220 the Supreme Court
of Appeals held that the 1877 act had not destroyed this
presumption. The court recognized that many states placed the
burden on creditors to prove fraud rather than on husband and wife
to disprove it, but commented that such decisions "attached more
weight in this respect to the change of property rights, and less to
the unchanged domestic relationship than is consistent with the
long and uniform course of authority in this state."221
During the years after they enacted married women's property
laws, Virginia, New York, and Wisconsin all had to deal with a
closely related question: the extent to which women would be
allowed to enforce their newly granted rights by suit. Virginia, like
New York, declined to expand married women's rights to sue by
215. 75 Va. 390(1881). In Williams, after a husband's business failed, his wife bought part
of his stock for consideration. The Supreme Court of Appeals held that under such
circumstances, the stock was not reachable by the creditors. See id at 403-06.
216. See id.
217. See, e.g., William & Mary College v. Powell, 53 Va. (12 Gratt.) 372 (1855).
218. See id. (finding a rebuttable presumption of fraudulent transfer when husbands
transfer property to their wives).
219. 9 S.E. 508 (1889).
220. 89 S.E. 908 (1916).
221. Id, at 910.
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broad statutory interpretation or otherwise. In Keister's
Administrator v. Keister's Executors,2 2 a wife who had been
assaulted by her husband asked the court to hold that, by necessary
implication, the 1877 married women's property act gave married
women the right to sue their husbands for personal injuries. The
court refused to do so. 221 It noted that the Virginia statute was
couched in procedural terms. The statute gave a married woman
the right to sue and be sued as if she were unmarried,2 4 which was
different than some states that allowed women to enjoy all rights
as though they had never been married. 25 The court reasoned that
this language did not confer on married women "the substantive
civil right of a legal existence and legal personality separate and
apart from that of the husband . . . but merely enlarge[d] the
remedies of married women with respect to substantive rights of
theirs existing at common law."226 Justice Martin Burks, the court's
expert on women's property law issues, emphasized that a more
liberal interpretation would injure the sanctity of the family:
I am unwilling, upon such language as is contained in the
foregoing statute, to obliterate the primary obligations growing
out of the marriage relation, to revolutionize the whole law
relating to the husband and wife, and open the courts to the
public discussion of domestic differences, which, when of
sufficient consequence, may be settled by the chancellor in suits
for divorce, or by prosecution for violation of the criminal laws
of the state.2s
Virginia also began to develop a body of divorce case law for the
first time in the 1870s. The Supreme Court of Appeals warned in
severe terms that it would do everything in its power to limit the
number of divorces in Virginia,22 8 but its actions visibly failed to
match its words. In its first divorce case, Bailey v. Bailey,2 9 the
court warned that "the whole scope and purpose of [the divorce
statutes] was to limit the jurisdiction of the courts, and to
222. 96 S.E. 315 (1918).
223. See i& at 316.
224. See id. at 322 (Burks, J., concurring).
225. See id. at 318.
226. Id. at 317.
227. Id. at 322 (Burks, J., concurring).
228. See, e.g., Bailey v. Bailey, 62 Va. (21 Gratt.) 43 (1871); Latham v. Latham, 71 Va. (30
Gratt.) 307 (1878).
229. 62 Va. (21 Gratt.) at 43.
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discourage suits of this character."2 3 It concluded its decision in
even stronger terms:
[W]e express the hope that such cases may be in the future as
infrequent as they have been in the past; that, amid the
whelming tide of social and political revolutions which threaten
to sweep away all the forms of our cherished southern
civilization, one pillar at least of the social fabric may still stand
firm... that marriage may in the future, as it has been inthe
past, be ever recognized in Virginia as an institution to be
cherished by law and sanctified by religion, upon which alone
the happiness and purity of social and domestic life must ever
depend."1
Nevertheless, the Bailey court passed up a prime opportunity to
interpret Virginia's divorce statutes narrowly. It held that no
minimum period of living apart was required to obtain a separation
decree based on desertion and that the intent to desert could be
established by the testimony of the divorcing spouses alone without
extrinsic evidence, despite the opportunities for collusion this
presented.232
Latham v. Latham' was one of the most important early
Virginia divorce cases. It sheds particular light on how the
Supreme Court of Appeals was grappling with the changing role of
women in southern society and southern marriages. The Lathams
were a prominent couple in Lynchburg society, and their divorce
had ample ingredients to cause a public furor: a bitter division
between the spouses over Reconstruction politics; a wife who
showed unmistakable signs of chafing in a traditional role, who
announced after the birth of their son that she would have no more
children and who eventually refused to have sexual relations with
her husband, perhaps because of illness or perhaps because of
hostility; and bitter quarrels between the wife and the husband's
family, all of which culminated in the husband's unannounced flight
with their son.23"
The court made two important holdings. Latham was the first
case to consider how broadly to define cruelty for purposes of
divorce. The court refused either to limit cruelty to cases of
230. Id. at 49.
231. Id. at 59.
232. See i& at 46, 50-52.
233. 71 Va. (30 Gratt.) at 307.
234. See id. at 321-22.
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physical violence or to extend it to all mental abuse."5 In the
majority opinion, Justice Waller Staples conceded that "there may
be cases in which the husband, without violence, actual or
threatened, may render the marriage state impossible to be
endured," but he emphasized that "what merely wounds the
feelings without being accompanied by bodily injury or actual
menace" would not be grounds for divorce. 2' Notwithstanding the
great bitterness between the Lathams, the court found that the
altercations between them did not rise to the level of cruelty,
particularly as Mrs. Latham was substantially at fault in
destroying the parties' relationship.2"7 Because Mr. Latham was
willing to reconcile with his wife and showed no intent to leave her
for good, there was no desertion.2 8
The court's holding provoked a lengthy dissent from Justice
Francis Anderson, who vehemently argued that the new cruelty
standard had been met based on Mr. Latham's removal of the
parties' child.2 3' He considered this to be outrageous.' Anderson
took pains to deny that Mrs. Latham "had any sympathy with the
dogmas known as 'woman's rights,' and he characterized her as
simply a woman of pride and spirit-traditional values with which
all Virginians could sympathize.2"1 Anderson argued that Mrs.
Latham had not challenged her husband's authority but had merely
exercised her right to demand that he exercise it "With tenderness
and consideration, which she rightly claims is due the wife."2 2 He
also suggested that if fault was to be considered, under traditional
Virginian standards of manhood Mr. Latham should bear a portion
of the fault."4 "A pretty complaint for a man to make to a court of
justice against his wife!" sniffed Anderson.2" "If it [Mrs. Latham's
refusal to have intercourse with her husband] was true," he asked,
"why didn't he put her privately away and let her take her child
with her?"'
Latham was also the first Virginia case to address child custody
issues. The court firmly adhered to the traditional common-law
236. See id. at 321.
236. Id.
237. See id. at 318-22.
238. See ia
239. See id. at 343, 388-89 (Anderson, J., dissenting).
240. See i& (Anderson, J., dissenting).
241. Id. at 346 (Anderson, J., dissenting).
242. Id. at 347 (Anderson, J., dissenting).
243. See id. at 372 (Anderson, J., dissenting).
244. Id. (Anderson, J., dissenting).
246. I& (Anderson, J., dissenting).
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rule giving the husband complete control of the children, but it
carved out some narrow exceptions.' For example, husbands could
be denied custody if they had committed "gross misconduct" or if
"the interest or happiness of the child imperatively require it."247
Some other states had adopted a "tender years" exception to the
traditional custody rule, giving mothers custody of very small
children.2" The Virginia court grudgingly allowed a limited "tender
years" rule, with an interesting gender distinction. The rule could
be used to allow little girls to remain with their mothers, but would
only be applied to little boys in extreme cases.24 9 The court also
injected an element of fault into the custody issue.2" Although Mrs.
Latham had been a good mother and was close to her children, the
court refused to allow her visitation because she refused to attempt
reconciliation with her husband.251
Anderson again disagreed with the majority. He argued that
the tender years doctrine should be adopted for both sexes and
should be a mandatory rather than merely a permissible exception
to paternal custody.252 In closing, Anderson implicitly illustrated a
central dilemma of fault-based divorce and drew a link between
women and slavery in language more characteristic of the 1970s
than the 1870s:
It is true that it is the husband's God-given prerogative to be
the head of his family,... but a woman when she marries does
not surrender all her rights.... She is not the slave of her
husband (though she is too often made such); she is morally and
socially his equal. She has her rights and privileges within her
sphere, which the husband cannot withhold from her except by
an act of oppression. And the care and nurture and training of
her children in the nursery is within her sphere, and properly
belong to her peculiar province.
246. See id. at 332.
247. Id.
248. The "tender years" doctrine was first enunciated by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court
in Commonwealth v. Addicks, 5 Binn. 520 (Pa. 1813). See Jamil S. Zainaldin, The Emergence
ofa Modern American Family Law: Child Custody, Adoption, and the Courts, 1796-1851,73
Nw. U. L. Rzv. 1038, 1062-59 (1979). New York adopted the doctrine soon after
Pennsylvania. See Ahrenfeldt v. Ahrenfeldt, 1 Hoff. Ch. 497 (N.Y. Ch. 1840). In some cases,
New York allowed children nearing adulthood to decide which parent should have custody.
See, e.g., In Matter of Wollstonecraft, 4 Johns. Ch. 80 (N.Y. Ch. 1819).
249. See Latham, 71 Va. (30 Giatt.) at 321-22.
250. See id. at 332-33.
251. See id.
252. See id. at 387 (Anderson, J., dissenting).
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The moral sentiment of the world looked with abhorrence on
the separation of a female slave who was a mother from her
offspring of tender years. It was not often done .... But to tear
from the bosom of a young, ardent, refined, highly cultivated,
amiable, devoted mother, eminently qualified, morally and
mentally, for rearing it, in defiance of her cries and entreaties,
the infant child that she has borne . . . is a barbarity and
refinement of cruelty which no man has a right to inflict on his
wife.... It is cruelty when inflicted, which entitles a wife to be
released from her obligations to her husband and to the
protection of the law in her custody of her child.'
The court continued to construe divorce standards narrowly
and to maintain an atmosphere of general disapproval of divorce,
broken only by an occasional equitable exception, during the half
century following Latham.2' " It consistently required substantial
reconciliation efforts to be made before divorce would be considered:
if one spouse indicated a desire to reconcile, divorce would be
refused even if the other spouse did not wish to reconcile or felt
with good objective reason that reconciliation was hopeless. In
Haynor v. Haynor,255 the court explained the policy behind this rule:
"When people understand that they must live together, except
for a few reasons known to the law, they learn to soften by
mutual accommodation that yoke which they know they cannot
shake off. They becomegood husbands and good wives from the
necessity of remaining husbands and wives; for necessity is a
powerful master in teaching duties which it imposes.
"2
253. Id. at 387, 3S9 (Anderson, J., dissenting).
254. See, e.g, Haynor v. Haynor, 70 S.E. 531 (Va. 1911) (reasoning that couples will work
out their differences if not given the option of divorce). For an example of an equitable
exception made by the Virginia court, see Ringgold v. Ringgold, 104 S.E. 836 (Va. 1920). In
Ringgold, the court upheld a judgment of divorce for a wife whose husband refused to
cohabitate with her after she told him of a youthful flirtation. See id. at 842. Although the
husband had not committed physical or verbal abuse, the court emphasized that the wife had
made extraordinary efforts to reconcile, all of which had been spurned; that the husband had
made her a "mere inmate" of their home; and that he had imposed a series of reconciliation
conditions which the court felt were unreasonable. See id. at 838-40.
255. 70 S.E. at 531.
256. Id. at 532 (quoting Sir William Scott's opinion in Evans v. Evans, 1 Hogg. C.R. 35
(1790)). Scott's opinion was a favorite of the court, which also quoted it in Latham and many
other late 19th century and early 20th century divorce cases. Scott's opinion was also a
favorite of the New York Court of Appeals.
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B. New York: Judicial Reaction to the Married Women's
Property Laws
The advances in women's property rights in New York between
1848 and 1860 were followed by a long period in which judicial
checks alternated with modest legislative advances. New York
judges generally interpreted the 1848 married women's property act
and the 1860 earnings law narrowly. Their conservatism was not
due purely to a sense ofjudicial restraint: they were deeply divided
over the wisdom of the early property acts. A few judges praised
the acts openly as a high embodiment of Jacksonian democratic
principles:
We have here no lords to whom we are bound to render homage.
We are all equal peers. A citizen here receives no new dignity
by holding an interest in lands. The maintenance and support
of the child, which was a reason for the introduction of such an
estate [i.e., a husband's right to his wife's property under the
unity doctrine], is more certain now by directly inheriting from
the mother, than to be dependent upon a father, whose dignity
and importance consist in the fact of having been a husband of
a wife who had an estate in lands. 7
The newly-formed Court of Appeals, however, was less
enthusiastic. The 1848 law faced constitutional challenges soon
after its enactment: opponents argued that it deprived husbands
of property without due process of law and impaired the contractual
obligations that spouses assumed at the time of their marriage
vows. In several early decisions, lower courts affirmed the
legislature's general power to regulate property rights arising out
of marriage, reasoning that because of the great effect the
institution of marriage had on society as a whole, marriage
contracts could be subjected to greater state regulation than other
contracts.2" In Holmes v. Holmes," however, the Court of Appeals
held the act did not apply to marriage rights in existence prior to its
enactment, because retroactive application of the act would impair
previously vested rights. Speaking for the majority of the court,
Justice Seward Barculo expressed open skepticism about the
legislature's decision to change the traditional common-law system:
257. Billings v. Baker, 28 Barb. 343, 349-50 (N.Y. App. Div. 1849).
258. See, e.g., Blood v. Humphrey, 17 Barb. 660 (N.Y. App. Div. 1854) (allowing married
woman's property to be deeded as an unmarried woman's property would be); White v. White,
5 Barb. 478 (N.Y. App. Div. 1849) (holding the 1848 law constitutional).
259. 4 Barb. 295 (N.Y. 1848).
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The experience of the sages and venerable men who have
preceded us, is as nothing, compared to the intuition of the
Solons of this "progressive" age. Legal forms, authorities,
precedents, maxims, adjudications, the knowledge of the past,
the learning of the present, all fade away and disappear before
the dazzling brightness of the new era. Whether these sudden
and violent innovations in a science which, of all others, is most
emphatically the result of time and experience, are to prove
beneficial to society, it remains to be seen.2"
During the last half of the nineteenth century, New York courts
gave full effect to the 1848 law as a device for protecting family
assets against claims of the husband's creditors, but they were
considerably more restrained in allowing the laws to serve as a
vehicle for the advancement of women's rights. In Yale v.
Dederer,6 1 the Court of Appeals held the laws eliminated any rights
that creditors might have to seek attachment of a wife's assets to
satisfy a husband's debts. Creditors could reach the wife's assets
only with respect to debts which had been incurred for the direct
benefit of the wife or her property, or for which the wife had directly
agreed to assume responsibility.1 2 The court refused to place debts
incurred for family purposes in this class.'s In a series of cases
concerning the status of businesses owned by the wife but operated
by the husband, the courts consistently held that the husband's
involvement did not make the business assets available to his
creditors: if his wife owned the land or facilities used to operate the
business, they were protected."' The profits of the business also
belonged to the wife and were sheltered, even if they were
generated through the husband's efforts or, conversely, were given
260. Id. at 299. The courts also rejected several invitations to construe the 1848 and 1849
acts broadly. See, e.g., Hurd v. Case, 9 Barb. 366 (N.Y. App. Div. 1850) (holding that the acts
did not affect dower, curtsy, or common law rights of inheritance generally).
261. 22 N.Y. 450 (1860).
262. See id. at 460-61.
263. See id. The Yale case had come before the court two years previously, prior to the
passage of the 1860 earnings law. At that time the court praised the common law's wisdom
in denying women the power to contract, viewing it as the best safeguard for the family
against the husband's creditors and commenting that "Itihis legal incapacity is a far higher
protection to married women than the wisest scheme of legislation can be." Yale v. Dederer,
18 N.Y. 265,272 (1858). What the court thought of the 1860 law, which gave women limited
power to contract, and of the subsequent 1884 law giving women full power to contract is
unclear. See supra notes 257-60 and accompanying text. In contrast to its comments on the
1848 and 1849 property laws in Holmes, it refrained from publicly giving its views on the
wisdom of the 1860 and 1884 laws.
264. See Gage v. Dauchy, 34 N.Y. 293 (1866); Sherman v. Elder, 24 N.Y. 381 (1862).
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to the husband: the courts reasoned that such income should be
applied first to support the family and that creditors had no priority
either morally or legally.
2 5
The New York courts applied quite different rules to work
performed by the wife. In Birkbeck v. Ackroyd,2 6 the Court of
Appeals created a presumption that a wife's entire wages, including
those earned outside the home, belonged to her husband: to
preserve her rights to her own income the wife had to explicitly
elect to exercise them.267 Even in cases where the wife made such
an election, the Court of Appeals refused to apply the 1860 earnings
law to income from work directly or indirectly related to household
activities.26 8 In so doing, the court affirmed that the asset-
sheltering function of women's property laws remained uppermost
in its mind and that the cult of true womanhood was still thriving
as the century neared its end:
It would operate disastrously upon domestic life and breed
discord and mischief if the wife could contract with her husband
for the payment of services to be rendered for him in his home
.... To allow such contracts would degrade the wife by making
her a menial and a servant in the home where she should
discharge marital duties in loving and devoted ministrations,
and frauds upon creditors would be greatly facilitated, as the
wife could frequently absorb all her husband's property in the
payment of her services, rendered under such secret, unknown
contracts.269
In Bertles v. Nunan,"70 the Court of Appeals also made clear it
would limit as much as possible the rights that the 1860 earnings
law had given women to make independent contracts. On a 5-2
vote, the court held that the 1860 law did not affect the husband's
common law inheritance rights in any way and that a wife's
"general engagements are absolutely void, and she can bind herself
by contract only as she is expressly authorized to do so by
265. See Abbey v. Deyo, 44 N.Y. 343 (1871); Buckley v. Wells, 33 N.Y. 518 (1865). This
position stands in contrast to the Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals decision in Penn v.
Whitehead, which gave Virginia couples considerably less protection against the husband's
creditors in such situations. See supra notes 182-84 and accompanying text.
266. 74 N.Y. 356 (1878).
267. See id. at 358; see also Filer v. New York Cent. R.R. Co., 49 N.Y. 47 (1872) (noting
that a woman's services belong to her husband and he may have an action for the loss of her
services due to personal injury).
268. See Coleman v. Burr, 93 N.Y. 17, 25 (1883).
269. Id. at 25-26.
270. 92 N.Y. 152 (1883).
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statute."2" The legislature finally reacted by providing in 1884 that
"[a] married woman may contract to the same extent, with like
effect and in the same form, as if unmarried, and she and her
separate estate shall be liable thereon.2 72
Apart from the 1884 law, the legislature's attitude toward
expanding married women's rights was mixed throughout the
second half of the nineteenth century. In 1862 it amended the 1860
earnings law to allow married women to enforce their rights by
suit,27 3 but in 1880 it repealed the law27' and did not restore it until
1890.215 The 1890 law gave married women a right of action for
injuries to their persons or property and also for injuries arising out
of the marriage "in all cases in which an unmarried woman or a
husband now has a right of action by law.2 76 In 1902, the
legislature also gave women the right to bring actions directly
against their employers to collect their wages and to redress other
work-related grievances. 7
The roles of the legislature and the courts were reversed with
respect to divorce law. Here, the legislature was the conservative
force and what little progress took place during the era came
through the courts. New York's population grew steadily during
the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, and presumably
the number of troubled marriages in the state grew accordingly.
The legislature consistently declined to add new grounds for
divorce,2 78 so the social pressure for new means of ending bad
271. Id. at 160.
272. 1884 N.Y. Laws 381.
273. See 1862 N.Y. Laws 172.
274. See 1880 N.Y. Laws 245.
275. See 1890 N.Y. Laws 51.
276. Id. The New York courts construed the suit provisions of the 1860 and 1862 laws
even-handedly while they were in effect, but they refused to interpret the laws to allow wives
to sue their husbands for torts, reasoning that the purpose of the provisions was "to
distinguish... [a wife's] property from her husband's, and not to confer rights of action upon
her, against him." Longendyke v. Longendyke, 44 Barb. 366, 368 (N.Y. App. Div. 1863); see
also Abbe v. Abbe, 48 N.Y.S. 25 (N.Y. App. Div. 1897) (denying a woman's right to maintain
an action against her husband for assault and battery). But cf. Bennett v. Bennett, 23 N.E.
17, 17 (N.Y. 1889) (holding that, under New York common law, wives had the right to bring
suit against other women for alienation of their husbands' affection). The Bennett court also
noted that lower courts routinely allowed wives to sue in their own name even after the 1880
repeal of the suit laws. See id. at 18-19.
277. See 1902 N.Y. Laws 289.
278. Several highly publicized divorce cases in the 1870s, most notably a divorce trial
involving religious and antislavery leader Henry Ward Beecher, made divorce reform a
touchy political topic. Furthermore, Elizabeth Cady Stanton and some other leaders of the
women's movement in New York advocated divorce on demand a century before its time.
Stanton urged that: "The wisest possible reform we could have on this whole question is to
have no legislation whatever. The relations of the sexes are too delicate in their nature for
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marriages found three new outlets: out-of-state divorces,
annulments, and a widespread but tacit agreement among litigants,
lawyers, and many trial judges to accept minimal evidence of
adultery as adequate proof in divorce cases.2" 9
Out of state divorces found particular favor with wealthy New
Yorkers. One spouse would establish temporary residence in a
state that allowed divorce based on a minimal period of separation
or based on other grounds more liberal than New York's. As soon
as the divorce was granted, the spouse would move back to New
York.2" Opponents of divorce reform raised the question of
whether New York was obligated to recognize such divorces but the
New York courts, citing the need to give official acts of other states
comity in New York, declined to overturn such divorces to any
significant extent. 81 Most out of state divorces, however, were
agreed on by both spouses and were not challenged in court.8 2
Paradoxically, although New York provided only narrow
grounds for divorce, it provided a higher than average number of
grounds for marriage annulment. Fraud was the most popular
ground for annulment, and an extensive body of case law developed
in New York as to what constituted fraud. The traditional common-
law rule was that pre-marriage misrepresentations would warrant
annulment only if they went to the "essentials" of the marriage
relationship."a In the late 1890s several decisions suggested the
courts were expanding their definition of what types of
misrepresentations went to "essential" matters.S In DiLorenzo v.
statutes, lawyers, judges, jurors, or our public journals to take cognizance of, or regulate.'"
BLAKE, supra note 109, at 99 (quoting Elizabeth Cady Stanton). Such remarks "made it easy
to denounce the protagonists of divorce reform as advocates of free love," and thus eroded
middle-class support for divorce reform. MAX RHEINSTEIN, MARRIAGE, STABILITY, DIVORCE
AND THE LAw 40 (1972).
279. See BLAKE, supra note 109, at 190-200.
280. See id, at 169-72.
281. See i& at 174-76.
282. See i. at 159-65,179-88. Blake commented that when he moved from Massachusetts
to New York in the mid-20th century, he was struck by the unique "atmosphere surrounding
divorce [in New York]. It was not that divorce was less common.... But over the landscape
of divorce a cloud of embarrassing ambiguity seemed to hang." Id. at vii.
283. See DiLorenzo v. DiLorenzo, 174 N.Y. 467,471-72 (1903); see also BLAKE, supra note
109, at 194-99 (discussing the rule).
284. See King v. Brewer, 29 N.Y.S. 1114 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1894) (annulling a marriage
because the husband had failed to tell his wife before marriage that he was running an illegal
pool hall); Keyes v. Keyes, 26 N.Y.S. 910 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1893) (annulling a marriage because
the husband did not toll his wife about his criminal past as a thief before marriage); BLAKE,
supra note 109, at 194-95; see also Fisk v. Fisk, 39 N.Y.S. 537 (N.Y. App. Div. 1896) (refusing
to annul a marriage based on the wife's failure to disclose a prior marriage and criticizing
trial courts' increasing liberality as to annulments).
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DiLorenzo, s5 the Court of Appeals ruled that fraud should turn
more heavily on the subjective intent of the parties than on the
objective nature of the misrepresentations. The DiLorenzo court
thus invoked the will theory of contract-'last seen in use by the
Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals to enforce premarital property
agreements2 M-to make annulments easier to obtain.2 7 In Pearson
v. Pearson,28 8 the court liberalized the standard for proving cruelty,
a less common ground of annulment, in a similar fashion: it
abandoned a long-standing rule limiting cruelty to physical abuse
and conduct endangering physical safety and held that cruelty also
could include serious mental abuse.28 9
Perhaps the most important device available to New Yorkers
not wealthy enough to afford out of state divorces was a tacit but
increasing trend among trial courts to accept only the most minimal
circumstantial evidence of adultery as sufficient for divorce. As
part of a nationwide reaction at the end of the nineteenth century
against increasing divorce rates, the legislature made several
attempts to restrict adultery divorces by tightening standards of
proof and requiring the plaintiff's spouse to show that he or she had
not condoned the defending spouse's behavior.29 By the early 1900s
agencies had arisen to provide ready-made proof of "adultery" for
husbands who desired a divorce. Such agencies would supply young
women that would go with the husband to a hotel. The two would
partially disrobe and climb into bed; after a few minutes, a
detective also employed by the agency would enter the room to
witness this proximity. Trial courts consistently held this was
adequate circumstantial evidence of adultery. The agencies quickly
became a scandal and remained so for decades, but the Court of
Appeals never took formal notice of the situation and for the most
part resisted invitations to make the trial courts' standards of proof
stricter. 9'
285. 174 N.Y. at 467.
286. See supra notes 47-51 and accompanying text.
287. See 174 N.Y. at 471-73. The court shied away, if only temporarily, from its consistent
pronouncements in other cases that because marriage contracts affected an important social
institution, the courts must consider the interests of society as well as the contracting parties
in interpreting them. The court suggested that in the future it would apply to 'a contract of
marriage ... those salutary and fundamental rules, which are applicable to contracts
generally when determining their validity.' Id. at 474.
288. 129 N.E. 349 (N.Y. 1920).
289. See i& at 350.
290. See 1899 N.Y. Laws 661; 1877 N.Y. Laws 168.
291. See BLAKE, supra note 109, at 189-94, 211-14.
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C. Wisconsin: Judicial Reaction and Legislative
Counterreaction
Even more than New York, Wisconsin's legislature and
Supreme Court engaged in a prolonged tug of war over the state's
1850 married women's property act for decades after it was passed.
The court consistently interpreted the act narrowly, and the
legislature made periodic efforts to broaden it. In Connors v.
Connors,292 the court held that Wisconsin's 1850 law did not extend
to a married woman's earnings.29 The legislature reacted by
passing an earnings law the same year, but the law allowed a wife
to retain her earnings only where the husband did not adequately
provide for her support.2 4
Notwithstanding the 1855 earnings law, the Supreme Court
held in the early 1860s that in most cases a married woman's
wages, as well as profits she realized from her own business, were
not separate property and therefore were within reach of her
husband's creditors. The court recognized that its holdings went
against the purpose of the 1850 law to shelter a married woman's
assets from her husband's creditors, but it held the law did not
clearly state this and refused to supply the omission.295 In this
respect, the court was significantly more conservative than its New
York and Virginia counterparts. Soon afterward the court also
narrowed the 1855 earnings law by holding that the law allowed a
married woman to control her wages only when her husband's
failure to support her was caused by "vice. 296 The court interpreted
the statute so as not to cover cases of mere poverty or
improvidence.297
Women's rights groups began to form in Wisconsin for the first
time in the late 1860s.29' The groups focused primarily on suffrage
and temperance, but they also criticized the state of women's
property rights in Wisconsin.299 In 1872, in response to these
complaints and in order to better shelter married women's assets,
the legislature passed a revised married women's property act
which unequivocally made a married woman's wages her separate
292. 4 Wis. 131 (1854).
293. See id. at 135.
294. See 1855 Wis. Laws 49.
295. See Elliott v. Bentley, 17 Wis. 610, 615 (1863); Todd v. Lee, 15 Wis. 400, 401 (1862).
296. See Edson v. Hayden, 20 Wis. 715, 718 (1866).
297. See id.
298. See Catherine B. Cleary, Married Women's Property Rights in Wisconsin, 1846-1872,
78 Wis. MAG. HisT. 110, 119 (1994-95).
299. See id.
ANGLICANS, MERCHANTS, AND FEMINISTS
earnings in all cases.3°° The act also exempted husbands from
liability for their wives' premarital debts.301
The tug of war between the legislature and the Supreme Court
continued after 1872. In Fuller & Fuller Co. v. McHenry, 2 the
court sharply limited married women's right to use their property
in any way which might threaten the traditional balance of power
within the marriage-in this case by contributing property to and
sharing management of a business in which a husband and wife
were partners. In Emerson-Talcott Co. v. Knapp, °3 the court
expanded its ruling and explicitly stated that any business
conducted by both spouses would belong exclusively to the
husband.' Again, this was a sharply more conservative treatment
of married businesswomen than in New York or Virginia. The
Wisconsin court also suggested that notwithstanding the wage
provisions of the 1872 law, a wife could not keep her wages as
separate property without her husband's consent.0 5 Justice Silas
Pinney, speaking for the court in the McHenry case, made clear in
blunt terms that the court wished to preserve the traditional
balance of power within the marriage:
It is not to be supposed that the legislature intended that such
relations and duties as exist between copartners in trade should
be devolved on husband and wife... as a possible means of
disturbing domestic peace and confidence, or that they might
become contentious litigants in an action to wind up, with a
receiver in charge of their affairs and resources."
The Wisconsin court also may have been motivated in part by
a continuing desire to protect creditors. Shortly after a severe
depression began in 1857, the court was forced to defend creditors'
rights by striking down a series of popular debtor relief laws
enacted by the legislature.0 7 As a result, it was arguably more
sensitive to creditors' rights than its counterparts in Virginia and
New York, and this may have carried over to its interpretation of
the married women's property laws. The Wisconsin legislature did
not respond directly to the Fuller and McHenry decisions, but
300. See 1872 Wis. Laws 155.
301. See id.
302. 53 N.w. 896 (Wis. 1892).
303. 62 NW. 945 (Wis. 1895).
304. See id. at 945.
305. See i&
306. McHenry, 53 N.W. at 898.
307. See RANNEY, supra note 4, at 88-93.
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between 1890 and 1920 it continued to increase women's property
rights in a slow, piecemeal fashion."°a
Although Wisconsin's divorce laws were more liberal than those
of New York, the trends in each state during the late nineteenth
and early twentieth centuries show some striking similarities.
Cruelty was the preferred ground for divorce in Wisconsin during
this period."oc Wisconsin, unlike New York, did not expand the
cruelty grounds for divorce to include abusive language or other
conduct creating mental distress.10 Nevertheless, a culture
developed among litigants, lawyers, and trial judges whereby
"cruelty" was interpreted to cover a broad range of marital conduct
and disputes, many of which were not stigmatizing."' Cruelty was
the most popular ground for divorce in Wisconsin because it best
reconciled the conflicting moral and practical sentiments of
Wisconsinites as to divorce. Wisconsinites, like New Yorkers,
wanted divorce to retain a moral component but at another level
they recognized the increasingly important role divorce played as
a safety valve, and they did not want the moral component to block
that valve. The cruelty ground for divorce, liberally interpreted,
met both needs. 12
Wisconsin gave women a somewhat more prominent role in
child custody than did New York and Virginia. This was perhaps
due in part to the fact that Wisconsin came into existence much
later than New York and Virginia so the traditional rule of
husbandly dominion over children never took deep root and was
thus easier to break away from. In Campbell v. Campbell,31 the
308. See, e.g., 1905 Wis. Laws 17 (allowing wives to sue for alienation of affection); 1891
Wis. Laws 34 (allowing women to receive assignments of property and act as receivers in
bankruptcy proceedings). The 1905 law was passed in reaction to Duffies v. Duffies, 45 N.W.
622 (Wis. 1890), in which the court clung to traditional limits on married women's right to
sue by holding they could not sue for alienation of affection even though their husbands
could.
309. See Stamp, supra note 166, at 84-88.
310. See Johnson v. Johnson, 4 Wis. 154 (1855); see also Beyer v. Beyer, 6 N.W. 807 (Wis.
1880) (holding that at least one incident of physical abuse or threat of physical harm was
necessary to establish cruelty).
311. See GLENDA RILEY, DIVORCE: AN AMERICAN TRADITION 98-90 (1991); Stamp, supra
note 166, at 84-88.
312. Conservative influences made themselves felt even in the state's efforts to liberalize
its divorce laws before 1900. In 1866 the Wisconsin legislature allowed divorce after a
voluntary separation of five years, making Wisconsin one of the first states to create a no-
fault ground of divorce. See 1866 Wis. Laws 37; Stamp, supra note 166, at 79. But the
voluntary separation law proved to be less revolutionary than expected, simply because
divorcing couples made little use of it. Cruelty continued to be the most popular ground for
'divorce. See id. at 87.
313. 37 Wis. 206 (1875).
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Wisconsin Supreme Court declared that the rule in favor of
husbands had never been more than a presumption. 14 It made
clear that the presumption was rebuttable and that custody would
depend on the circumstances of both parents and the best interests
of the children. 15 The difference between Wisconsin's rule and the
rules followed in New York and Virginia was real: nineteenth
century Wisconsin courts granted custody to mothers more
frequently than did most other states.3 16
IV. THE YEARS OF INTERLUDE (1920-1960)
The most dramatic advance in American women's rights came
in 1920 with the ratification of the Nineteenth Amendment to the
United States Constitution, extending suffrage to women. 3 7 The
Nineteenth Amendment was the culmination of a seventy-year
campaign which had consumed much of feminists' energy during
that period. 318 Partly because of sheer fatigue and partly because
of a split between "equal rights" feminists who wanted a broad
equal rights amendment to the Constitution and "special rights"
feminists who wanted to preserve women's special social identity
and many of their special legal privileges, a period of dormancy
ensued: few major advances in women's rights were made during
the decades following 1920.319 This held true in New York and
Virginia, and to a lesser extent in Wisconsin also.320
A. New York: An Era of Piecemeal Reforms
There was little change of any significance in New York
women's property rights or divorce rights between 1920 and 1960.321
314. See id. at 210.
315. See id. at 211. The court also gave nominal support to the "tender years" doctrine,
but it consistently emphasized that trial courts had broad discretion to depart from the
paternal custody rule and tender years doctrine whenever they saw fit to do so. See Jensen
v. Jensen, 170 N.W. 735 (Wis. 1919); Welch v. Welch, 33 Wis. 534,542 (1873); see also Dovi
v. Dovi, 13 N.W.2d 585 (Wis. 1944) (discussing 19th century custody rules).
316. See RILEY, supra note 311, at 92.
317. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIX
318. See GENEVIEVE G. MCBRIDE, ON WIscONSIN WOMEN 294-98 (1993).
319. See id.
320. See id.
321. The most important change during the period was the legislature's abolition of
curtesy and dower in 1930, in favor of a new statutory system which guaranteed widows
minimum shares of both real and personal property from their husbands' estates, the shares
varying based on whether the couple had children. See 1929 N.Y. Laws 229. As previously
noted, a detailed study of the relationship between inheritance laws and women's rights is
outside the scope of this Article.
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The struggle over the extent to which women should be allowed to
enforce their statutory property rights against their spouses by suit
came to a conclusion during the era. In Allen v. Allen,32 the Court
of Appeals held on a 5-2 vote that notwithstanding the legislature's
1890 reinstitution of women's right of suit, the court's late
nineteenth century decisions declining to extend this right to tort
claims against their husbands were still good law.32 Justice
Cuthbert Pound, dissenting, argued that interspousal immunity
was no more than a remnant of the unity doctrine, that "[elvery
step in the history of legislation in regard to married women.., has
been in the direction of the complete abrogation of the rule," and
that "vestigial rights of the husband should disappear with the
shattered organism, 324 but his arguments were not persuasive to
his colleagues. They were more persuasive to the public: Allen
triggered a wave of protest, and, after the usual procedural delays
and committee deliberations, the 1937 legislature enacted a
comprehensive statute abolishing all remaining interspousal
immunities.
325
The tension between divorce traditionalists and reformers
continued to produce stalemate throughout the era. "Adultery
agencies" continued unabated, as did the tacit agreement among
divorce courts and lawyers to accept contrived evidence of adultery
as sufficient. Conservatives lamented that "our courts and our
judges have been conditioned by public opinion to dispose of
matrimonial matters in the same manner as ordinary commercial
litigation, without any expressed concern for the larger public
interest."3 2' Legal commissions regularly called for liberalization of
divorce as the only solution, particularly after the New York City
(Manhattan) district attorney made a well-publicized investigation
of fraud in the divorce system in 1948.327 The New York State
Catholic Welfare Committee, however, was a formidable force
against divorce liberalization throughout the era; and by taking
advantage of its political power and legislative inertia, it succeeded
in blocking any important legislative reform of the divorce laws. 2s
322. 159 N.E. 656 (N.Y. 1927) (per curiam).
323. See id. at 656.
324. Id. at 660-61 (Pound, J., dissenting).
325. See 1937 N.Y. Laws 669.
326. Richard H. Wels, New York: The Poor Man's Reno, 35 CORNELL L.Q. 303,308 (1950).
Wels believed the courts condoned easy divorce in part because if out-of-state divorces were
the sole outlet available to New Yorkers it would lead to widespread economic resentment
on the part of those who could not afford such divorces. See id. at 315.
327. See BLAKE, supra note 109, at 211-17; Wels, supra note 326, at 305.
328. See BLAKE, supra note 109, at 206-08.
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B. Virginia: The Effects of Creeping Divorce
Virginia courts and legislators made no significant changes in
married women's property rights law or divorce law between 1920
and 1960. An important subterranean change marked the period,
however: Virginia's divorce rate accelerated sharply, and this
started a process that eventually led to major changes in the state's
divorce laws after 1960. Selected divorce rates for each of the three
states featured in this study are shown in the table below.
Divorces per 1,000 Population"
United States Virginia New York Wisconsin
1870 0.28 0.05 0.16 0.38
1880 0.39 0.11 0.16 0.40
1916 1.13 0.86 0.33 0.69
1930 1.56 1.34 0.38 0.85
1940 2.00 2.00 0.80 1.10
1950 2.60 1.80 0.80 1.40
1960 3.20 2.40 0.40 0.90
1970 3.50 2.60 1.50 2.00
1980 5.20 4.40 3.50 3.70
1990 4.70 4.40 3.20 3.60
1995 4.40 4.40 3.10 3.40
329. See BUREAUOFTHECENSUS, U.S. DEPT. OFCOMMERCE, STATISTICALABSTRACTOFTHE
UNITED STATES 108 (1997); BUREAU OFTHE CENSUS, U.S. DEPT. OF COMMERCE, STATISTICAL
ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES 67-68 (1975); MARY SOMERVILLE JONES, AN HISTORICAL
GEOGRAPHYOFTHEGCHANGINGDIVORCE LAWINTHEUNITEDSTATES37.38, 49-51,72-73,92-93,
101-02, 117-18, 128, 154 (1987).
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How did Virginia accommodate the increasing demand for
divorce in the face of its long tradition of official disapproval of
divorce? The Supreme Court of Appeals did not relax its standards
for proving adultery to any significant degree: in 1961 a
commentator concluded that a Herculean effort was still required
to obtain a divorce for adultery in Virginia. 3 Desertion became the
most popular ground for divorce among Virginians in the early
twentieth century.3 1 The Supreme Court of Appeals sent some
signals that it was willing to allow separation decrees for cruelty on
a more liberal basis than before, 3 2 and, conspicuously, the strong
tone of disapprobation so common in late nineteenth century
opinions was replaced by a distinctly weary tone in the 1 9 3 0 s.'
There are no studies or statistics proving that Virginia trial courts
followed New York's example of turning a blind eye to collusion and
manufactured evidence in adultery, desertion, and cruelty cases,
but it seems likely that they did so to some extent: the dramatic
increase in the divorce rate surely cannot be accounted for by
statutory changes and court signals alone.
C. Wisconsin: A Judicial Boost for Women's Rights
Although Wisconsin was not a leader in the women's suffrage
movement, after the Nineteenth Amendment was ratified
Wisconsin went beyond mere implementation of the Amendment:
it enacted a group of laws that substantially expanded women's
rights, including a pioneering equal rights law. At the beginning of
the 1921 legislative session, a bill to give women the right to sit on
juries was defeated.' The defeat spurred Wisconsin feminists to
mount a campaign for more comprehensive antidiscrimination laws.
After extensive lobbying, the 1921 legislature enacted a law giving
men and women equal rights with respect to custody of their
children and eliminating the presumption of paternal
330. See Alexander J. Michalos, Note, Some Statistics and Comments on the Statutory
Grounds for Divorces in Virginia, 3 WM. & MARY L. REV. 181, 181 (1961).
331. See JONES, supra note 329, at 92-93.
332. See, e.g., Gentryv. Gentry, 172 S.E. 157 (Va. 1934) (allowing divorce where husband
abandoned wife for "necking" with another man); Ringgold v. Ringgold, 104 S.E. 836 (Va.
1920) (allowing divorce for mental cruelty alone).
333. Compare Devers v. Devers, 79 S.E. 1048 (Va. 1913) (speaking disapprovingly of
divorce in the 19th century manner), with Gentry, 172 S.E. at 157 (speaking of divorce in a
more resigned tone).
334. See Zona Gale, The Status of Wisconsin Women Under the Equal Rights Law, 1923
WIS. ST. B. Ass'N PRoc. 168, 168-69.
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guardianship. 5 Feminist forces then obtained passage of a broad
equal rights bill which provided:
Women shall have the same rights and privileges under the law
as men in the exercise of suffrage, freedom of contract, choice of
residence for voting purposes, jury service, holding office,
holding and conveying property, care and custody of children,
and in all other respects."
Yet the law did not by any means signal the end of the cult of true
womanhood in Wisconsin. The law's supporters took pains to
assure the public that the law would promote, not destroy, women's
role as a nobler if weaker counterpart of men. Novelist Zona Gale
of Portage, one of the leaders of the 1921 campaign, explained to a
meeting of the state bar association:
[E]very man knows what a woman's point of view, when it is
wise and sane and kindly, can contribute to life.... The
difficulty is to generalize, to realize that more women have that
wisdom and that sanity or, when they haven't, that we must
help them to develop these broadly social qualities. The
opportunities of men to express a social spirit in their living are
still double and triple those of women. Yet women have a
spiritual genius which has never been given social expression.
It is precisely this which they could liberate into the world, for
the general welfare, if all these meshes of little circumstance
hampering them could be swept away and they could be given
the moral backing of a general consciousness of equality of
opportunity.31
In Wait v. Pierce, a deeply divided Wisconsin Supreme Court
departed dramatically from its past practice of interpreting
women's rights laws narrowly. The court held by a 4-3 vote that the
1921 equal rights law abolished husbands' immunity from suit by
their wives. 9 The dissenters accused the majority of sweeping
away the common law of married women's rights without legislative
authority and striking a blow at the sanctity of family.' Justice
335. See 1921 Wis. Laws 15, 147.
336. 1921 Wis. Laws 529.
337. Gale, supra note 334, at 182.
338. 209 N.W. 475 (Wis. 1926).
339. See id at 480-81; see a/so First Wis. Nat'l Bank v. Jahn, 190 N.W. 822 (Wis. 1922)
(holding that the 1921 law eliminated common law restrictions on married women's right to
guarantee payment of promissory notes).
340. See Wait, 209 N.W. at 481-83 (Eschweiler, J., dissenting).
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Marvin Rosenberry, speaking for the majority, bluntly refuted these
objections. Rosenberry concluded the 1921 law was too broad to be
limited to suffrage and emphasized that the law, by its wording,
provided for equality "in all... respects."34 Rosenberry discounted
the dire predictions of the dissenters:
[Tihe family relation is not disturbed by the enactment of
statutes conferring rights upon married women. It is only when
the ideal family relation has for some reason been disrupted
that rights under the statue are asserted.... [Wihile there are
many persons, particularly those of the older generation, who
are genuinely alarmed at the statutory modification of the
family status as it existed at common law, there are an equal if
not a greater number who see in the emancipation of married
women a necessary genuine social advance.'
The Wait decision was emblematic of the times: in the 1920s
and 1930s, the Wisconsin court was known for its propensity to
make policy and to defend its policymaking in unusually blunt
terms.' Wisconsin's departure from strict construction was in
striking contrast to the New York court's refusal in Allen, decided
the year after Wait, to eliminate interspousal immunity.3' Virginia
has preserved the interspousal immunity doctrine to the present,
although the Supreme Court of Appeals carved out limited
exceptions to the doctrine. 5
Cruelty continued to be the most popular divorce ground in
Wisconsin after 1900, accounting for more than eighty percent of all
341. Id. at 478.
342. Id. at 478-79. In Fontaine v. Fontaine, 238 N.W. 410 (Wis. 1931), the court conceded
that Wait was"probably against the weight of authority," but it noted the legislature had not
overturned Wait, and accordingly it declined to do so. Id. at 412.
343. See, e.g., State ex rel. Wisconsin Inspection Bureau v. Whitman, 220 N.W. 929 (Wis.
1928) (recognizing, contrary to prevailing doctrine, that administrative agencies had de facto
law-making powers and arguing that frank recognition of that fact was necessary to
accommodate the law to modern society); see also RANNEY, supra note 4, at 381-88.
344. See supra text accompanying notes 322-24.
345. See Counts v. Counts, 266 S.E.2d 895 (Va. 1980) (refusing to extend Korman to a case
where the wife had contracted to have her husband killed and stating that interspousal
immunity is "an integral part of the public policy of the Commonwealth to preserve the
family unit"); Korman v. Carpenter, 216 S.E.2d 195 (Va. 1975) (allowing wife's estate to sue
husband for killing wife and noting that this was an extreme case and that exceptions to
interspousal immunity should be made sparingly because "interspousal immunity is only a
part of a whole system of laws and policies which recognizes the mutual obligations arising
from a marriage and which encourages both marital and family harmony"); Surratt v.
Thompson, 183 S.E.2d 200 (Va. 1971) (allowing suit against husband for injuries due to his
negligence in automobile accident); Vigilant Ins. Co. v. Bennett, 89 S.E.2d 69 (Va. 1955)
(allowing wives to sue husbands for property damage).
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divorces by the 1930s.' The culture that nineteenth century trial
courts had developed of using cruelty as a "catch-all for widely
varied types of marital friction" 7 and for granting divorces they
felt were equitably necessary grew ever stronger. According to
Professor Nathan Feinsinger of the University of Wisconsin Law
School, who investigated the system in the early 1930s, most
Wisconsin judges believed that when a marriage deteriorated to the
point of filing a divorce suit, they could do little to save the
marriage. 8 If they refused to grant divorces because the evidence
of cruelty was thin or fictitious, they would only encourage unhappy
couples to commit real cruelty and violence. 9 The Wisconsin
Supreme Court did not encourage this trend, but it did condone it.
In 1916, four years before New York (but forty years after Virginia),
the court relaxed the nineteenth century rule that actual or
imminent physical harm must be shown in order to establish
cruelty and held that conduct causing mental suffering, serious
stress, or a threat to health was sufficient." The court also began
to focus on the effects rather than the nature of conduct in
determining whether it was cruel, thus further softening the law.351
The legislature made no substantive changes in the divorce statutes
during this period. It created the post of divorce counsel in each
county court to guard against collusive cases,"' but due to
inadequate funding and lack of cooperation from trial judges the
law was never effective.3 a
V. THE SECOND WOMEN'S RIGHTS MOVEMENT (1960-PRESENT)
In the mid-1960s, women's place in American society began to
receive renewed attention. It is no exaggeration to label the
changes in women's rights that have taken place during the last
346. See Stamp, supra note 166, at 87.
347. N.P. Feinsinger, Observations on Judicial Administration of Divorce Law in
Wisconsin, 8 WIS. L. REV. 27, 32 (1932).
348. See id. at 30.
349. See id. at 30-32.
350. See Hiecke v. Hiecke, 157 N.W. 747 (Wis. 1916); Banks v. Banks, 155 N.W. 916 (Wis.
1916). New York relaxed the standard for cruelty in the 1920 Pearson case, see supra notes
288-89 and accompanying text, and Virginia allowed some consideration of mental cruelty
for the first time in the 1878 Latham case, see supra notes 235-36 and accompanying text.
The leading cases for the original strict definition ofcrueltyin Wisconsin were Beyer v. Beyer,
6 N.W. 807 (1880) and Johnson v. Johnson, 4 Wis. 154 (1855).
351. See Bird v. Bird, 177 N.W. 4 (1920).
352. See 1909 Wis. Laws 323. The Supreme Court had held that collusive divorces
constituted a fraud on the court in Hopkins v. Hopkins, 39 Wis. 167, 170 (1876).
353. See Feinsinger, supra note 347, at 34-35.
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three decades as a revolution, the full consequences of which are
still unfolding. Much of the revolution has taken place within the
framework of the law: American lawmakers have had to grapple as
never before with the proper role of divorce in the social fabric and
the concomitant issues of what property and custody rights women
should have during and after marriage.
Although the modern women's movement is popularly thought
of as national,' modern divorce and women's property laws have
evolved in New York, Wisconsin, and Virginia in strikingly different
ways. New York adopted a rudimentary no-fault divorce system in
1967 but waited until 1980 to make meaningful reforms in property
division and maintenance rules. Wisconsin adopted a comprehen-
sive reform plan covering all three areas in 1977. Wisconsin also
made a profound change in married women's property rights in
1986 when it became the first and so far only common law state to
convert to a community property system. Virginia, by contrast, has
found ways to liberalize its divorce and property laws while
preserving an important element of its tradition of official
disapproval of divorce.
A. No-Fault Divorce and Its Relationship to Marital Property
Rights
The concept of no-fault divorce was first developed about 1915
and first received serious attention at the national level in the late
1940s." 5 During the next twenty years, for a variety of reasons, it
gained support only slowly. Judicial distaste for forcing couples at
risk for serious discord to stay together, which trial courts had
manifested through liberal interpretations of cruelty since the early
twentieth century, became increasingly less tacit and more overt3
But Americans' traditional reluctance to condone divorce publicly
remained so strong that in many states, no progress toward a no-
fault system was made until it was promoted as a procedural rather
than a substantive legal reform." During the 1950s and early
1960s the Catholic church continued to make opposition to divorce
reform a priority, but after that time the church increasingly turned
its attention to abortion issues."8 Growing public familiarity with
354. See, e.g., HOFF, supra note 4, at 231, 291-92, 324-30.
355. See RILEY, supra note 311, at 161-62. Seegenerally Reginald HeberSmith, Dishonest
Divorce, ATLANTIC MONTHLY, Dec. 1947, at 42.
356. See supra text accompanying note 347; see also JACOB, supra note 3, at 31-35, 78-79.
357. See JACOB, supra note 3, at 31-36, 90-95.
358. See id. at 34-40.
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child welfare laws, which had been commonplace since the
Progressive era in most states, led to increasing acceptance of the
idea that the state had the right to intervene in troubled family
structures. The fault concept, which at bottom is useful only in
evaluating purely private relationships, was correspondingly
weakened. 59
In the 1970s no-fault divorce achieved a sudden breakthrough.
In 1970 only a handful of states had any sort of no-fault divorce
grounds, and only one state, California, had a "pure" no-fault
divorce law.360 By 1987, thirty-six states had some form of no-fault
divorce. 1 The sudden shift was due in part to the culmination of
many of the factors discussed in the preceding paragraph, but it
also was related to a dramatic increase in divorce rates between
1965 and 1980. The reasons for that increase have been and
continue to be the subject of vigorous and often bitter debate. One
group of scholars has argued that the increase in divorce rates and
in permissiveness toward divorce was part of the more general
ascendance of the culture of self in American law and society. In
Lawrence Friedman's words:
[In t]he nineteenth century... [mlobility was economic and
political; it was not a freedom to contrive a lifestyle; the body
and mind still proceeded within narrow but invisible ruts.....
The new century redefined the terms, and added freedom to
shape one's own life, expressive freedom, freedom of personality,
freedom to spend a lifetime caressing and nurturing a unique,
individual self.'
Other scholars, however, have viewed the modern history of
divorce as a largely unintended and unforeseen consequence of
women's increasing economic power and social rights:
359. See id at 9-11.
360. See Henna Hill Kay, Equality and Difference: A Perspective on No-Fault Divorce and
Its Aftermath, 56 U. CwIN. L. REv. 1, 5-6 (1987).
361. See id. There are three main types of no-fault systems. "Pure" no-fault systems
generally specify that irretrievable breakdown of a marriage is the sole ground for divorce
and do not permit any consideration of fault in awarding maintenance and dividing property.
"Mixed" no-fault systems combine traditional fault-based grounds such as adultery and
cruelty with marital breakdown; however, most such systems permit consideration of fault
as a factor in custody, maintenance, and property division decisions. Divorce after a period
of separation may also be defined as a third no-fault ground of divorce. In 1987, 15 states
including Wisconsin had "pure" no-fault systems; 21 states had a "mixed" system; and 14
states, including New York and Virginia, allowed divorce based on separation for a given
period of time. See id. at 1 n.1.
362. LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, CRimE AND PUNISHMENT IN AMERICAN HISTORY 12, 13
(1993); see also BARBARA DAFOE WHITEHEAD, THE DIVORCE CULTURE 44, 70 (1997).
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The strains that women's entry into the workforce put on many
marriages, as men and women adjusted to new and more fluid
roles, cannot be gainsaid .... At least as important, though, is
the fact that many more wives can now imagine surviving
economically on their own, and so have much less incentive to
stay in lousy marriages.
... [Tihe growing tendency of courts to award custody of
young children to their mothers [also encouraged more women
to divorce.13
Surprisingly, feminists devoted relatively little energy to the no-
fault divorce movement. Probably the most important impetus
came from two pillars of the legal establishment, the National
Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws (NCCUSL)
and the American Bar Association (ABA). In 1970 the NCCUSL,
after years of hesitation, adopted a Uniform Marriage and Divorce
Act which specified "irretrievable breakdown" of the marriage as
the only ground for divorce." In 1974, after a prolonged debate,
which focused mostly on technical details rather than broad policy
issues, the ABA approved the Act.36 5 The Act has not been used
widely as a model by the states, but the imprimatur it received from
the NCCUSL and the ABA gave no-fault divorce a legitimacy in the
eyes of many who would not otherwise have accepted it.'
B. Wisconsin: The Reform Tradition in Flower
Wisconsin fell squarely in the mainstream of the no-fault
divorce movement. The Wisconsin legislature first seriously
considered no-fault divorce in 1957 but, due in large part to
opposition from the Catholic Council for Home and Family, the
proposal did not come close to passage. 7 In 1967 a bill was
363. Margaret Talbot, Love, American Style: What the Alarmists About Divorce Don't Get
About Idealism inAmerica, NEw REPUBLIC, Apr. 14, 1997, at 30, 34-35; see also RILEY, supra
note 307, at 163-66.
364. See UNIF. MARRIAGE & DIVORCE ACT § 306, 9A U.L.A. 242 (1998).
365. See JACOB, supra note 3, at 74-77.
366. See id. at 66-77. It is also important to note that even before the no-fault era, many
states including Wisconsin and Virginia allowed divorce on grounds that were effectively no-
fault, such as separation for a given number of years. Wisconsin first adopted such a
standard in 1866, Virginia in 1960. See supra note 312; Part IV.B. An important but little
recognized by-product of the no-fault movement was that between 1960 and 1980, it became
acceptable for the first time to refer openly to these grounds as no-fault grounds.
367. See Stamp, supra note 166, at 118.
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introduced adding incompatibility as a new ground for divorce, but
it also failed.3 8
After the NCCUSL adopted the Uniform Marriage and Divorce
Act in 1970, many Wisconsin lawmakers worried the state would
fall behind the times if it did not follow the NCCUSL's lead. In
1971 the legislature reduced the waiting period for divorce based on
voluntary separation from five years to one year, and this ground
of divorce swiftly gained popularity. 9
Several no-fault bills were introduced into the 1975 legislature.
Catholic forces were considerably more muted on divorce than they
had been during the 1950s, but influential Wisconsin feminists took
the position that any divorce reform should include a
comprehensive overhaul of property award rules as well as "pure"
no-fault divorce based on irretrievable breakdown only.370 In
particular, they argued, any new system should include strictly
objective standards for dividing property and awarding
support-standards which recognized the difficulty newly-divorced
homemakers would have re-entering the job market-and strong
support enforcement and collection programs.3" A debate also took
place over counseling: several Catholic groups wanted mandatory
pre-divorce counseling to encourage reconciliation, and many
feminists wanted counseling to help the parties adjust to divorce.372
In 1977, the Wisconsin legislature resolved these disputes and
enacted a "pure" no-fault divorce system.3  The new system made
irretrievable breakdown the sole ground for divorce and provided
that breakdown could be established by the testimony of a single
spouse, even over the other's opposition. 374 The new law made a
bow to traditionalists by emphasizing in its preamble that it was
"not intended to make ... divorce ... easier to obtain"375 and by
requiring reconciliation counseling.7 6 The mandatory counseling
requirement was repealed in 1987, although the law still provides
368. See id. at 118-19.
369. See id. at 120-22; 1971 Wis. Laws 220.
370. See Kurt Dettman, Note, The Displaced Homemaker and the Divorce Process in
Wisconsin, 1982 WIS. L. REV. 941, 982-54.
371. See id.
372. See id.; Stamp, supra note 166, at 122-23.
373. 1977 Wis. Laws 105.
374. See id. § 23. The law provided that testimony of a single spouse was sufficient to
establish irretrievable breakdown only if the parties had lived apart voluntarily for one year
or more. Otherwise, if one spouse opposed the divorce, the court could order the divorce
action to be held in abeyance pending counseling or could determine after a hearing that the
marriage was irretrievably broken. See id.
375. Id. § 1.
376. See id. § 15.
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for voluntary counseling which is used mostly to mediate child
custody disputes."'
Soon after the legislature enacted no-fault divorce, it
established pioneering standards for support. It required the State
Department of Health and Social Services to establish child support
payment guidelines and required the courts to consider the
guidelines in establishing child support. In 1985 it required the
courts to follow the guidelines in all but exceptional cases.379 The
legislature also created a presumption that marital property should
be divided equally between the spouses, although it also gave trial
judges limited discretion to divide property unequally in exceptional
cases.8' S The legislature gave trial courts more discretion in
awarding spousal support, although it indicated judges should
consider dividing income so as to enable each spouse to enjoy as
nearly as possible the standard of living both had had before
divorce.s 1
This represented an important departure from prior practice.
Unlike New York and Virginia, which for the most part left
property division and maintenance to the equitable discretion of
trial courts and were reluctant to set guidelines, Wisconsin was
thought to have established a rule of thumb that maintenance and
property division should be tied to the widow's one-third dower
share.8 2 Yet in 1970, the Supreme Court disclaimed such a rule
.and returned to a system of pure equitable discretion.8 3 But the
new system went farther. Not only were trial judges required to
consider the wife's needs in dividing property and awarding
alimony: they were now required to start from the presumption
that the property and living standard of each spouse should be
equalized and to justify any departure from that standard. 8
377. See 1987 Wis. Acts 355.
378. See 1983 Wis. Acts 27, § 1762; 1981 Wis. Laws 20, § 1785. The Department
eventually established a sliding scale of percentages. Each parent in a one-child family was
required to contribute 17% of his or her income to child support; in a 2-child family, 25%; in
a 3-child family, 29%; and in a 4-child family, 32%. See Wis. STAT. § 767.25 (1997-98); Wis.
ADMIN. CODE § 80 (1998).
379. See 1985 Wis. Acts 29, § 2360.
380. See 1977 Wis. Laws 105, § 41.
381. See WIS. STAT. ANN. § 767.26(6) (West 1993); Bahr v. Bahr, 318 N.W.2d 391 (Wis.
1982).
382. See, e.g., Gauger v. Gauger, 147 N.W. 1075 (Wis. 1914).
383. See Lacey v. Lacey, 173 N.W.2d 142 (Wis. 1970). In fact, the court contended that it
had always evaluated property and alimony division on an equitable, case-by-case basis. See
id. at 144.
384. See id.
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Wisconsin made another change in women's property rights
which broke new ground not only at the state but at the national
level. Beginning in the early 1970s a group of legal scholars,
including Professor June Miller Weisberger of the University of
Wisconsin Law School, focused its attention on the community
property system that prevailed in eight southern and western
states.8 The system, which had its origins in Roman law and had
prevailed in continental Europe for centuries, gave both spouses
equal control over all property acquired during marriage. N6
Weisberger and other reformers argued that community property
reflected much better than prevailing common law rules the nature
of marriage as a partnership and the economic contributions that
married women made to their households.8 7 The movement
undoubtedly was helped by the fact that the proportion of married
women earning income outside the home had increased rapidly
since the 1940s, but the reformers favored community property law
because it recognized the value of household work as well as
income-producing work.8 8
The movement began in earnest in Wisconsin in 1974, when
hearings of the Governor's Commission on the Status of Women
revealed widespread concern that existing inheritance laws were
not providing adequate security for women.3s It accelerated in
1983 when the NCCUSL published a Uniform Marital Property Act
recommending a community property system nationwide.39 The
movement gradually gained bipartisan support in the Wisconsin
legislature. Opponents of community property did not challenge the
need for laws giving women equal property rights; rather, they
argued that the common law had proved sufficiently adaptable to
changing concepts of women's rights in the past and that conversion
to a new system was unnecessary and socially disruptive. They
proposed a "common law alternatives" bill, which would allow
385. See generally Howard S. Erlanger & June M. Weisberger, From Common Law
Property to Community Property: Wisconsin's Marital Property Act Four Years Later, 1990
Wis. L. REV. 769; June M. Weisberger, The Wisconsin Marital Property Act: Highlights of
the Wisconin Experience, 13 COMKUNITY PROP. L.J. 1 (1986).
386. A short summary of the historical origins of community property law and its
introduction into the southwestern United States can be found in KATHLEEN E. LAZAROU,
CONCEALED UNDER PETTICOATS: MARRIED WOMEN'S PROPERTYAND THE LAW OF TEXAS 1840-
1913, at 44-50 (1986).




390. See UNIF. MARITAL PROPERTY ACT, 9A U.L.A. 103 (1987); Erlanger & Weisberger,
supra note 385, at 771-74.
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married couples to choose either community property or the existing
common law system.391  The reformers replied that only a
community property system could give women adequate and
guaranteed access to martial income and property and also to credit
based on shared income and assets. Many supporters emphasized
that a new system would have symbolic as well as practical value
in showing women that Wisconsin was committed to equal rights in
practice as well as in theory. 92
The legislature finally enacted the proposed system in 1983. 393
Wisconsin's marital property act closely followed the Uniform Act:
it created a presumption that all income and property of spouses is
marital and subject to equal sharing. Yet the Wisconsin act went
beyond the Uniform Act in some respects, most notably in providing
assurances that married women who do not work outside the home
will be able to use marital property and income to get easier access
to credit.394
C. New York: Stop-and-Go Reform
New York has moved in the same direction as Wisconsin,
though not as far. Pressure for divorce reform in New York
increased steadily after World War H."" As in Wisconsin, Catholic
resistance to reform gradually slackened as the church focused its
efforts on fighting abortion reform rather than divorce reform. 96
The final catalyst was Rosenstiel v. Rosenstiel, 7 in which the Court
of Appeals decided to recognize the validity of Mexican divorces,
which were notoriously easy to obtain, in New York. Despite the
protest of two dissenters that federal comity rules did not require
391. See Erlanger & Weisberger, supra note 385, at 775-76; Weisberger, supra note 385,
at 11-13. See generally WISCONSIN LEGISLATIVE REFERENCE BUREAU, INFORMATIONAL BULL
84-IB-1, MARITAL PROPERTY Acr. A COMPILATION OF MATERIALS (1984) [hereinafter BULL
84-IB-1].
392. Seegenerally Lynn Adelman et al.,Departuresfrom the Uniform MaritalPropertyAct
Contained in the Wisconsin Marital Property Act, 68 MARQ. L. REV. 390 (1985).
393. See 1983 Wis. Acts 200.
394. See id.; Wis. STAT. ANN. § 766.56 (West Supp. 1999). In 1985 the legislature belatedly
followed New York's lead by replacing dower and curtesy with an augmented estate system,
similar to another plan recommended by the NCCUSL. See 1985 Wis. Acts 37; see also WIS.
STAT. ANN. §§ 861.01-861.43 (West 1991 & Supp. 1999). Wisconsin's delay in reforming its
inheritance laws may have been due in part to the fact that, unlike New York and Virginia,
its dower system included personal property as well as real property. This feature dated
from- the Northwest Ordinance of 1787. See Maxwell H. Herriott, Should the Estates of
Dower and Curtesy Be Abolished in Wisconsin?, 1948 WIS. L. REV. 461, 464.
395. See BLAKE, supra note 109, at 211-25.
396. See JACOB, supra note 3, at 34-37.
397. 262 N.Y.S.2d 86 (N.Y. 1965).
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New York to recognize foreign divorces, the majority bluntly stated
that "such recognition... offends no public policy of this state.""'3
Rosenstiel was interpreted as a message from the state's highest
court that the time had come to liberalize divorce.
These forces, together with a prudent decision on the part of
reformers to present no-fault divorce as a procedural rather than a
policy reform, finally induced the legislature in 1966 to add a no-
fault ground, namely separation for two years, to the state's divorce
law. s As in Wisconsin, a mandatory conciliation provision was
inserted in the law in order to obtain its passage.4° Once the no-
fault threshold had been crossed, additional reforms came relatively
quickly: the separation period was reduced to two years in 1968,"'
and in 1973 the conciliation provision was repealed. 4 2 But unlike
Wisconsin, New York did not couple property division and alimony
reform with no-fault reform, and it did not eliminate fault as a
factor in property division and maintenance awards.
It is not clear whether no-fault divorce improved the lot of
married women in New York. In 1973, one commentator concluded:
"It must, with regret, be reported that... lower New York courts
appear somewhat loathe to leave the 19th century behind."0 3 A
limited survey of divorces during the early years of the no-fault era
suggested that only about one-sixth of all couples invoked
separation as their ground for divorce.' More than half of all
divorces were based on cruelty, and the trial courts were applying
traditional standards for awarding support and property. 5 About
five percent of all separating couples continued to seek
annulment.4°6 In 1980, the legislature finally addressed property
and maintenance reform when it enacted an Equitable Distribution
Law as part of a general effort to make the state's statutes gender
neutral. 7 The Equitable Distribution Law required trial courts to
distribute all marital property "equitably" between the parties, but
unlike Wisconsin, the New York legislature did not create an initial
398. Id. at 91.
399. See 1966 N.Y. Laws 254.
400. See ia
401. See 1968 N.Y. Laws 799.
402. See 1973 N.Y. Laws 1034.
403. Lee E. Teitelbaum, Cruelty Divorce Under New York's Reform Act: On Repeating
Ancient Error, 23 BUFF. L. REV. 1, 28 (1973).
404. See id. at 39-40.
405. See id.
406. See id For examples of post-reform decisions applying traditional standards to
divorces based on cruelty, see Rios v. Rios, 311 N.Y.S.2d 664 (N.Y. App. Div. 1970); Pierone
v. Pierone, 293 N.Y.S.2d 256 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1968).
407. See 1980 N.Y. Laws 281.
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presumption of equal division."8 The legislature also replaced
alimony with maintenance payments, which were to be based
largely on the goals of maintaining the parties' standard of living
during the marriage and providing for the recipient's "reasonable
needs.""' As initially written, the law encouraged courts to limit
the duration of maintenance in order to push recipients to become
self-supporting as quickly as possible. After extensive protests that
the law ignored the needs of older and disabled women with no job
skills other than homemaking, the legislature in 1986 amended the
law to encourage more liberal use of indefinite maintenance in such
cases.
410
The legislature deadlocked over whether fault should be a
factor in making maintenance awards and dividing property.
Accordingly, the Equitable Distribution Law did not address the
issue, but allowed the courts to consider "any... factor which [they)
shall expressly find to be just and proper."" After some early
disagreements among the lower appellate courts, the Court of
Appeals ruled in O'Brien v. O'Brien"2 that fault could not be
considered in property division "[e]xcept in egregious cases which
shock the conscience of the court.""' The New York courts
consistently have emphasized that consideration of fault is
inconsistent with the underlying assumption of the Equitable
Distribution Act "that each party has made a contribution to the
marital partnership and that upon its dissolution each is entitled
to his or her fair share of the marital estate." 4 The courts have
indicated that fault may be more pertinent to maintenance awards,
but they have been reluctant to give fault much weight even in the
maintenance context because of the legislature's stated goal of
using maintenance to allow the economically weaker spouse to
achieve self-sufficiency rather than to assign blame for the failure
of the marriage. 15
408. See id. § 9.
409. See id.
410. See 1986 N.Y. Laws 892, 894.
411. N.Y. DOM. REL LAW § 236, pt. B, §§ 6(d)(13) & 6(aX1l) (Consol. 1990).
412. 66 N.Y.2d 576 (1985).
413. Id. at 589-90; see also Blickstein v. Blickstein, 472 N.Y.S.2d 110 (N.Y. App. Div.
1984).
414. Blickstein, 472 N.Y.S.2d at 113.
4156. The leading case on this issue is Wilson v. Wilson, 476 N.Y.S.2d 120 (N.Y. App. Div.
1984).
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D. Virginia: Balancing Reform with Tradition
Virginia further illustrates the pitfalls of regarding the no-fault
movement as a simple, cohesive reform movement. It is the only
one of the three states in this study that did not have a no-fault
movement denominated as such in the late 1960s and 1970s; but in
its own way it took more dramatic steps away from its traditional
divorce system than did either New York or Wisconsin.
By the 1960s, Virginia, like much of the rest of the South, was
experiencing substantial social and demographic upheaval. World
Wars I and II created two major urban areas in what had
previously been an almost entirely rural state: the Virginia suburbs
of Washington, D.C. and the Norfolk region. Both areas continued
to grow rapidly after 1945, supported by the continuing growth of
the national government and the defense buildup of the Cold War
era. Residents of these areas had a degree of cosmopolitanism and
national orientation that was new to Virginia. Richmond and other
cities, which were also growing rapidly due to migration from the
Virginia countryside, experienced some of the same influences.416
Virginia retained (and retains to this day) a strong element of
cultural conservatism, but its new demographics affected its views
of divorce and women's property rights as well as many other
aspects of its political and social life.
Virginia has engaged in an incremental but almost continuous
course of divorce and property law reform since 1960. In the latter
year the legislature enacted the first divorce ground that could
fairly be termed no-fault: separation for three years. 17 In 1964 the
separation period was reduced to two years,418 and in 1975 it was
reduced to one year.419
In 1982, the Virginia legislature followed the lead of Wisconsin
and New York in revamping its property division and alimony
standards.420 Virginia's reforms were more conservative than those
of New York and Wisconsin. The 1982 standards required trial
courts to consider factors very similar to those used in Wisconsin
and New York in setting alimony and maintenance, but where New
416. See DABNEY, supra note 9, at 463-64, 564-67; RUBIN, 8upra note 8, at 160-61, 173-76,
207-08.
417. See 1960 Va. Acts ch. 108; see also 1962 Va. Acts ch. 288.
418. See 1964 Va. Acts oh. 648.
419. See 1975 Va. Acts ch. 644; D.A. Hendler & W. Kendall Lipscomb, The Ninth Ground
for Divorce in Virginia: Statutory Separation for Three Years, 3 WM. & MARY L. REV. 311
(1962); W. Kendall Lipscomb, Ninth Ground for Divorce: Addendum, 4 WM. & MARY L. REV.
36 (1963).
420. See 1982 Va. Acts ch. 309.
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York allowed only limited consideration of fault in making such
awards 421 and Wisconsin's pure no-fault system did not allow it at
all,422 the Virginia standards explicitly required courts to consider
fault in cases in which the parties invoked a fault-based ground of
divorce.423 The standards also required the courts to deny
maintenance to adulterous spouses. 24 In 1988, however, the law
was amended to prohibit using fault as a basis for denying all
maintenance except in limited circumstances.425
The Virginia courts' treatment of the new divorce laws is
reminiscent of their even-handed implementation of the married
women's property act a century ago. They have not used the new
laws to try to move Virginia closer to a "pure" no-fault model, but
neither have they tried to limit the effect of the changes made by
the legislature. They have emphasized that Virginia, like New
York and Wisconsin, now regards marriage as a full partnership
which must be treated as such in divorce proceedings. Fault can be
considered in dividing property only to the extent that it has
affected the financial well-being of the marriage. The Virginia
courts, like their New York counterparts, have given fault a
somewhat larger role in maintenance decisions, but they have made
clear that maintenance is to be based primarily on each spouse's
financial need and ability to pay.426 The courts also have
emphasized that Virginia's long equity tradition will continue in
this area: property division and maintenance awards ultimately
"involveD an adjustment of the equities, rights and interest of the
parties. 27 These rules reflect the courts' broader "recognition of
the regrettable fact of human experience that for various reasons
parties determine to terminate their marriage. 428
421. See supra text accompanying notes 402-03.
422. See supra text accompanying note 373. The 1977 Wisconsin divorce law did not
explicitly ban consideration of fault, but the Wisconsin legislature's decision to make
irretrievable breakdown the only ground for divorce effectively excluded any consideration
of fault from the divorce process. The Wisconsin Supreme Court confirmed this in Dixon v.
Dixon, 319 N.W.2d 846 (Wis. 1982).
423. See 1982 Va. Acts ch. 309.
424. See id.
425. See 1988 Va. Acts ch. 620.
426. For examples of maintenance awards, see Mason v. Mason, 165 S.E.2d 392 (Va. 1969),
and Dotson v. Dotson, 480 S.E.2d 131 (Va. Ct. App. 1997). For examples of property division,
see id. and O'Loughlin v. O'Loughlin, 458 S.E.2d 323 (Va. Ct. App. 1995).
427. Dotson, 480 S.E.2d at 132 (quoting Brown v. Brown, 361 S.E.2d 364,368 (Va. Ct. App.
1987)).
428. Dexter v. Dexter, 371 S.E.2d 816, 819 (Va. Ct. App. 1988). Virginia, like Wisconsin,
also has made important changes in the field of inheritance rights. In the early 1960s, a
movement arose to abolish dower and curtesy rights in Virginia and replace them with a
uniform augmented estate system. Proponents argued that existing laws had worked for
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VI. CONCLUSION
A. A Mixed Outcome for the Initial Predictions
How do the predictions set forth at the beginning of this article
hold up against the historical reality of married women's rights in
Virginia, New York, and Wisconsin? The experiences of each state
prove the predictions right in some respects and disprove them in
others. Both the proof and the disproof yield valuable insights into
what makes each state's legal culture distinctive.
1. Virginia and the Use of Women's Rights as a Social
Preservative
Any theory that assumes there is a direct correlation between
social progressivism and promotion of women's rights is exploded
as soon as one looks at Virginia's early history. Virginia's policy of
fostering premarital trusts to preserve to women their separate
property did not evolve out of solicitude for women as individuals:
it evolved out of solicitude for the preservation of their kinship
groups' place in the state's social order, combined with a recognition
that, due to the laws of biology, not all planters would have sons to
whom they could pass on their holdings.
To a lesser extent, the same is true of New York, which,
although it was more commercially oriented than Virginia,
remained a heavily agricultural state with an important
concentration of large landholders well into the nineteenth century.
Though the trust system was not intended to help promote women's
rights, it ultimately had that effect by providing a tool that, as the
New York courts eliminated trustees in the early nineteenth
century, allowed women to exercise more direct power over their
property and helped pave the way for married women's property
laws.
a predominantly rural society but no longer served in a rapidly urbanizing state with an
increasing proportion of its wealth in personal property and intangibles rather than real
estate. See generally Joseph L. Lewis, It's Time to Abolish Dower and Curtesy in Virginia,
3 U. RICH. L. REv. 299 (1969); Maria Dill, Note, The Constitutionality of the Feme Sole Estate
and the Virginia Supreme Court's Creation of an 'Homme Sole Estate in Jacobs v. Meade,
19 U. RICH. L. REv. 163 (1984). In 1977 the legislature enacted a law providing that dower
and curtesy were to be equal in all respects, and in 1990 it abolished them outright and
replaced them with an augmented estate system similar to Wisconsin's system. See 1990 Va.
Acts ch. 831; 1977 Va. Acts ch. 147.
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2. The Link Between Debtor Relief and Women's Rights
In all three states studied, married women's property acts
originally were enacted primarily to shelter assets from husbands'
creditors rather than to give women greater power over their own
destiny. This link between debtors' rights and women's rights
raises larger questions which deserve exploration. Did legislators
view the increase in women's rights Which the acts created as an
unpleasant but necessary price to be paid for debtor relief, or did
they at least to some extent see both results as a public good? Were
states that favored debtor relief likely to favor expansions of civil
rights more than states that were less sympathetic to debtor relief?.
3. Judicial Resistance to Broad Interpretation of Married
Women's Property Acts
In the states covered by this study, judicial enthusiasm for
implementing married women's property acts was inversely
proportional to the speed with which legislators enacted such laws.
New York and Wisconsin were among the earliest states to adopt
such laws, but a struggle then followed between the legislature and
the courts over expansion and implementation of the laws. New
York's and Wisconsin's courts did not strike down the women's
rights laws, but they consistently gave the laws a narrow
interpretation and tried to preserve much of the old order of
common law property rights.
Virginia was slow to adopt a married women's property law,
but once it did the Supreme Court of Appeals explicitly renounced
a narrow interpretation of the law in the Williams case.429 The
Virginia court did not go out of its way to expand women's rights by
liberal statutory construction-indeed, in Keister it proved as
reluctant as the New York and Wisconsin courts to expand women's
capacity to sue in order to enforce their statutory rightsS°-but the
fact that it formally renounced narrow construction when it did not
have to is significant. As a general matter, did states that adopted
married women's property acts relatively late experience less
judicial resistance and less tension between legislators and courts
than did states that adopted such acts early? This question also
deserves further exploration.
429. See supra text accompanying note 215.
430. See supra text accompanying notes 222-23.
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4. 'Cultures" for Accommodating Social Pressure for
Divorce
From the mid-nineteenth century onward Virginia, New York,
and Wisconsin all experienced real, if unacknowledged, social
pressure to make divorce easier and, concomitantly, a steady
increase in divorce rates. Each state developed a separate response
to this pressure. The differences say much about the overall culture
of each state.
Virginia developed what may be called the "culture of rhetoric,"
which combined sharp official denunciations of divorce as an
institution with flexible applications of conservative divorce laws.
Much more than New York or Wisconsin, the Virginia Supreme
Court of Appeals took pains to attack divorce in the abstract as an
evil and a blight on society. Yet when the court had opportunities
to back up its rhetoric by construing grounds for divorce narrowly,
more often than not it passed them up. The court continued to
denounce divorce well into the 1930s, but even as Virginia's divorce
rate soared, the hand-wringing over "adultery agencies" and
complaisant trial judges common in New York and Wisconsin was
conspicuously absent in Virginia decisions and legal commentary.
It is entirely possible that the "culture of rhetoric" that the Supreme
Court of Appeals developed gave Virginia trial courts cover to follow
the high court's underlying policy of flexibility, while allowing the
state to postpone formal change until its sense of conservatism and
social order had time to adjust to the true inevitability of such
change.
New York, by contrast, developed a "culture of tension" in
dealing with divorce, which to some extent corresponded to its
demographic and economic diversity. The legislature's consistent
failure to expand the grounds for divorce beyond adultery created
an acute dilemma for unhappy couples and for the courts. As a
result, the New York courts led the way in devising alternate
means of separation including liberalized annulment standards,
broad comity for out-of-state divorces, and relaxed evidentiary
standards for adultery. But such creativity did not go without
severe criticism, even from some of its active practitioners who felt
their efforts to accommodate the reality of family discord came at
the price of eroding respect for the law. New York finally took a
step over the barrier of divorce reform in 1967, but the tension
between supporters of more complete reform and those who wish to
preserve at least some of the traditional stigma of divorce continues
to this day.
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Wisconsin has long had a propensity for legal independence and
innovation. Given the Wisconsin legislature's regular efforts to
overcome judicial conservatism in family law during the late
nineteenth century and the state's innovativeness during the no-
fault era, its response to increased pressure for divorce can
accurately be labeled the "culture of reform." Wisconsin law and
society have been influenced heavily by New York in many ways.
Why has Wisconsin's divorce experience been so different? Part of
the answer lies in the fact that the legacy of colonial law was much
weaker in Wisconsin than New York: as a new state in the late
1840s, heavily influenced by New England's more liberal notions of
family law as well as by New York law, Wisconsin had an
opportunity to develop a relatively liberal divorce system from
scratch which New York did not.
5. The Universal but Irregular Modern Revolution
Viewing the post-1960 changes in women's property rights in
historical context makes clearjust how revolutionary these changes
have been. A particularly striking feature of the revolution is its
universality: Virginia, New York, and Wisconsin all have enacted
important changes in married women's property law and divorce
law. Yet the pace of change has varied in each state and has been
affected by the unique underlying characteristics of each state.
New York and Virginia represent conservative models of
modern change. Both states implemented no-fault divorce law not
by enacting a "pure" no-fault system, with marital breakdown as
the only ground for divorce, but simply by allowing divorce based on
separation. Their choices reflect a continuing tension between
traditional and modern concepts of divorce and family. New York's
difficulties in letting go of the traditional system have been
contentious and well publicized; Virginia's less so, in keeping with
its long tradition of cloaking change in the language of moderate
conservatism.
Property reform has occurred at a different pace in each state.
Wisconsin, in keeping with its penchant for making major changes
in bursts rather than in steps, overhauled its rules for maintenance
and property division in 1977 to conform closely to a community
property concept of marital assets and earning powers. New York
and Virginia remodeled their maintenance and property division
rules later and less completely. New York legislators were
ambivalent about abandoning the fault concept in these areas,
Virginia legislators less so. The courts in both states have shown
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considerably less ambivalence than their legislatures in minimizing
the role of fault in both areas: their decisions may be paving the
way for eventual public acceptance of a community property concept
of marriage and divorce.
B. Fitting the States into a Larger American Model
This Article's foray into comparative state legal history
suggests that, at least with respect to married women's rights,
Virginia, New York, and Wisconsin all fall within the boundaries of
a larger American tradition. If there is a single overriding theme
characterizing the American tradition, it is reliance on notions of
equity. Women are not, and never have been, a group that
lawmakers can isolate by means of special laws. Men and women
are irrevocably bound together in the world, and in law as in most
other aspects of life they cannot exist without each other. Thus in
the end, it is not surprising that Virginia and New York tempered
the harsh effects of the unity doctrine on women by use of trusts
and other equitable devices. At some level, legislators and judges
must have realized that was necessary for society as a whole, not
just for women. When equity disappeared as a separate legal
system, these states and the new state of Wisconsin preserved a
large element of equity in the form of broad judicial discretion over
such subjects as maintenance, property division in divorce, and
carving out a "wife's equity" in assets of insolvent husbands as
against the claims of creditors. Equity has not been a cure for all
injustice to women, but it has served as a useful safety device
during the long periods between major reforms.
The three states show a consistent sequence of women's rights
reforms that is probably characteristic of many states and is also
part of an overall American model. The equitable trust system of
the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries slowly gave way to a
sense that women should be given a direct, statutory right to
control their property rather than having to rely on equitable relief
fashioned by the courts. The married women's property laws of the
nineteenth century were the result. Although such laws were
passed mainly because of a desire to shelter assets for the benefit
of husbands, they established a framework on which later feminists
could build.
During the century following the wave of married women's
property acts, women's rights evolved slowly and fitfully out of a tug
of war between state legislatures and courts. In most states the
legislature took the lead in expanding property rights; but courts
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took the lead in accommodating increased social pressure for
divorce. For better or worse, divorce inevitably freed women from
the legal constraints marriage imposed on them and gave them a
legal right to a portion of the family's property and income. The
more accepted divorce was, the more established such rights
became in the minds of the public, the legislators, and the judges.
This helped pave the way for the no-fault revolution and for modern
changes in maintenance and property division rules after 1960.
Virginia, New York, and Wisconsin all have followed this
sequence, but they have done so in unique ways. New York's
following of the sequence was marked by innovation and
controversy, like many other aspects of the state's social history.
New York was the first state to adopt a broad married women's
property act, and it was one of the most important battlegrounds for
the subsequent struggle between lawmakers and judges over how
fast the rights conferred by those acts would be expanded. The
battle between divorce traditionalists and reformers, and the
related battle over maintenance and property division reform, also
have been more acute in New York than elsewhere.
Stylistically, Virginia has been New York's exact opposite.
Virginia's order-loving nature has not caused massive resistance to
expansion of women's rights, but it has produced the "culture of
rhetoric" which the state has used to effect gradual but real change
while reassuring its people that social order and regularity
continue. This culture appears to have been eminently satisfactory
to most Virginians and to have been a mostly successful method for
allowing Virginia to follow the American model of change.
Wisconsin at some points has been even more contentious than
New York. The late nineteenth century struggle between its
legislature and courts over implementation of women's property
laws was the sharpest of the three states, yet several decades later
the Wisconsin Supreme Court's decision to maximize the scope of
the far-reaching 1921 women's equal rights law, which had no
contemporary counterpart in either New York or Virginia, was
equally controversial. In the end, women's property rights in
Wisconsin have largely been saved from the level of contentiousness
that has plagued New York by the fact that Wisconsin generally
does not undertake reform unless it is ready to make a thorough job
of it. This is evidenced most recently by the fact that Wisconsin's
no-fault reform, combined with its 1984 community property law,
constitutes a far more decisive move toward the modern concept of
marriage as a community of interest than have either New York's
or Virginia's reforms.
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As predicted at the beginning of this Article, the influences of
colonial law, slavery, a concomitant preference for strong social
hierarchy, economics, commerce, Jacksonian ideas, and the frontier
lifestyle all have played a role in explaining the different evolutions
of married women's rights in the states studied here. But
individual character quirks of each state also have emerged in this
study. Those quirks-Virginia's love of order and moderation, New
York's extreme diversity, Wisconsin's restiveness and penchant for
periodic but thorough reform-are real, not flights of romantic
fancy, and they too have played an important role in shaping each
state's law. What quirks characterize other states, and how such
quirks have influenced those states' legal systems in the area of
women's rights and elsewhere, is a potentially vast field ripe for
further study.
